‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎263r] (532/722)

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(4) Capitation tax, amounting to 1 kvan on each male over 18 years of
age.—This is not exacted from the inhabitants of towns, who may
be said to be exempt from all direct taxation.
(5) Rates levied upon shopkeepers, artisans, and tradespeople,—which are
fixed at about £0 per cent, on their annual profits; and duties
exacted for all provisions brought to market in the principal
towns.
In theory, these are the taxes authorised by the Persian government;
but, in practice, a very complicated and irregular system of taxation is pur
sued, the main feature of which appears to be that it is designed solely with
a view to take as little as possible from the wealthy and inlluential classes,
and to get as much as possible from the hardworking peasant. The object,
indeed, of all Persian governors and their subordinates, as well as of the
landowners generally, is to avoid simplicity; for the more intricate and
uncertain the method employed for levying taxes, the greater are the
opportunities afforded for extortion and all sorts of illegal exactions.
Instead, therefore, of simply adhering to the above rates, by which the
revenue is made to depend upon the actual produce yielded by the land, a
sum often arbitrarily fixed is demanded from each village, without any
reference to failure of crops, insufficiency of water for irrigation, disease
amongst their flocks, or other losses to which the peasants may be subjected.
The amount to be demanded is determined from time to time by govern
ment assessors (mumaiyizm), who are despatched to the various districts
to assess the taxes whenever the authorities may feel disposed to alter their
amount.
The assessor is supposed to perform this duty in accordance with the
rates authorised by government; but great injustice is done on such occa
sions, as he invariably demands a large fee before giving his decision, and
overestimates the taxes if it is refused, or undervalues them when liberally
paid.
If the land belongs to an influential person, when taxed at all, the
amount is made very trifling; and in numerous instances villages, which
have not been assessed for many years, continue to pay only a nominal sum,
though they may have increased in size and wealth, simply on account of
the proprietors high position; while others, which have become impover
ished, are compelled to pay all the taxes imposed under more prosperous
conditions. Nothing can be more unfair than this system; for Persian
villages undergo rapid changes, caused not unfrequently by oppression, and
often from the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient supply of water for irriga
tion. But even when, for the reasons just stated, the taxes are lightly
assessed, the peasants gain nothing, unless they are the owners of the land
themselves; for the full imposts are exacted and are ultimately paid, either
to the local authorities or to the proprietor of the village, or to the person
who may hold it in tiul, or fief (if crown property), from the Persian
government. In such cases the government is, in reality, the loser.
Under a more rational system the Persian revenues might be greatly
increased, with less hardship to the peasants, whose taxes are now so
irregular and uncertain, that they scarcely know, from year to year, what
their liabilities are.
Scarcely any of the inhabitants of towns, or persons of rank in Persia,
are called upon to contribute towards the expenses of the state. None of