‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎28v] (61/722)

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Towards their own Government, in spite of their more prosperous condi
tion, I observed that the feelings of the people were as hostile as in other
parts; and it is scarcely too much to say that they are entirely open to
Russian influence, and would accept Russian rule as a deliverance. The
evils of a weak and unsympathetic government have been as keenly felt
on this border as in the eastern districts; and the contrast between the
Russian system and their own is more fully appreciated. The extension
of Russian rule is regarded apparently by all classes as inevitable and a
matter of time merely; and the prospect was regarded with satisfaction
only mingled with regret that their future rulers were not of the “ true
faith.” Possibly actual contact will arouse feelings of antagonism ; but,
to judge from the spirit of the people, Russian annexation would be followed
by the voluntary submission of all the important classes.
Russian influence has for years been at work in the country, and the
“ sense of the inevitable,” which alone must go far to crush out all idea
of opposition, is aided by a fii’m belief in the superior material advantages
that would be secured by Russian rule; among the first and greatest of
which is believed to be complete relief from troubles at the hands of the
Turkmans. c< May the Russians come to-morrow, if their coming will
stay the hands of these descendants of the evil one, ” was a sentiment
reiterated so often, and with so much fervour, that it would, without doubt,
have great effect in paving the way to a peaceful subjugation.
Russian influence has permeated the country so completely that it was
a matter of no surprise to find that the people believe in and know of no
other power.
The power that makes light of the Turkmans cannot in their imagina
tion have any equal upon earth ; and it would be no easy task to teach them
to the contrary.
The question of the resources that the district of Astarabad possesses for
the supply of an army is a most important one, and
Resources. one about which I had the utmost difficulty in obtain
ing any sort of information. In other parts the grain
assessments of villages had been a sort of guide to an estimate of the sur
plus produce; but these have been all, or nearly all, remitted in Astarabad,
and the large area that is capable of bearing grain crops without irrigation
raises a greater difficulty, for the measure afforded by the quantity of avail
able water in the dry highlands is here lost.
Under these circumstances, it was impossible to arrive at any figures
likely to indicate the quantity of grain that a force collected in the country
would find available for its subsistence; and I am forced to fall back on a
few general observations.
In the first place, it is worthy of note that, though there is an immense
area of cultivable waste, both irrigated and unirrigated,
capable of bearing wheat crops, and no great scarcity
of hands, even the pressure of five years’ famine in
the neighbouring highlands failed to produce any but
the most moderate extension of grain culture in the
Persian villages or the Turkman camps. The difficulties of export across
the Alburz, over which nothing worthy of the name of a road exists, and
the insecurity of the roads along the border by which only the easier passes
at Astarabad and Naudfh can be reached, were the chief obstacles to a
remunerative export of corn ; and to these obstacles there can be no doubt
Famine in the high-
lands failed to produce
any extension of grain
culture.