File 522/1922 Pt 7 'Bahrain: Persian claim to sovereignty; Persian Treaty negotations 1929-1930' [‎533r] (1070/1126)

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opinions expressed by this
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laemor indum on Bahrein immediately
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P ° Siti0n “ Bahrein of Majesty’s Government.
'Oveiahepaitoitat e estSluS eS Y' S f GoVemment ’ as stated above ' hav e
importance of establishing that r^nStinn ,JLioie - At_ the same time, the
increased since 1908. From the naval ^ 1 S - a , ) e ^ J ! lsls lias ver 3' greatly
been suggested, as a pis alleraTl L 'T^ ’ Bah a m ’ altl TS h ;t has
disadvantage of unhealthy climate an I * 1 • <lse or a coaling depot, has the
importance Iromte stantott Sitisf " tt fnlyt^fet
of His Majesty s Government render them less likely to be disturbed by
anti- - ritish i amours than other places on the Arabian coast. The
Government of India (substantial Indian commercial interests in Bahrein
apart) take the view that Bahrein as a central air base and political centre
lor the control ol the increasingly important Arab littoral may he regarded
.as a key position inside the Gulf of an importance at least equal to that of
Muscat at its mouth. The probability that Persia will press her efforts to
terminate British influence on the south Persian coast, the necessity, sh oul d
those efforts succeed, of consolidating that influence on the Arab littoral, and'
the possibility that the removal, of the headquarters of the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency.
from Bn shire may have to be considered, all combine to invest Bahrein with
an importance very substantially greater than in 1908 from the standpoint
of His Majesty’s Government.
43. On the assumption, then, that Imperial considerations, our obligations
to the Sheikh apart, make it desirable for Bis Majesty’s Government to
maintain and consolidate their position in Bahrein, the question arises of
how this is to be achieved. The matter is one which calls for careful
handling. On the one hand, Persia has appealed to the League, on the
Council of which she is now represented, and there is a possibility that she
may endeavour to make a compromise on Bahrein a condition precedent
to agreement with TIis Majesty’s Government on other Gulf questions. On
the other hand, it appears that a compromise, even on the basis of the
maintenance of the status quo, would have a definitely unsettling effect on the
Sheikhs, who are suspicious that His Majesty’s Government may use them
as pawns to secure concessions from Persia of value to Great Britain only ;
that a decision which will definitely dispose internationally of the Persian
claim is therefore desirable : and that, while the deposed Sheikh Isa remains
sensitive regarding the maintenance of internal independence, the cle facto
ruler, his heir, and his brother, are anxious, in the face of Persian claims, to
admit to the full the protection of Great Britain. It may perhaps be assumed,
that if the Persian claim could be disposed of belore His Majesty s
Government had finally consolidated their position, much siiongei
opposition to such consolidation might be expected from the i uling family,
and this appears to make it desirable to seize the piesent oppoituniU to
establish the British position once for all.
44 The simplest method of at once asserting internationally the British
view of the status of Bahrein and establishing the position in the islands
of His Majesty’s Government vis-a-ms the Sheikh, would probably on the
whole be the conclusion of a formal treaty of protection, a course under
consideration in India (see para. 34 above) at the time of the reassertion of
the Persian claim last year. Had Persia been prepared to abandon hei chum
in deference to His mW* Government, the Treaty w,th Bahrem ™, d
hare been concluded simultaneously with its abandonment. V t A
undoubtedly not prepared to compromise, such a treaty could only bo
concluded m the fad of Persian protests to the League and elsewhere,
and the wider considerations of international policy myolved m its
conclusion would call for close examination before a decision is taken
re ° An’aiternatiy e method of solution might be arbitrati on, to which various
obiections are^ubvimi^—