File 522/1922 Pt 7 'Bahrain: Persian claim to sovereignty; Persian Treaty negotations 1929-1930' [‎177r] (358/1126)

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justifiable for His Majesty’s Government to take the line that this development
proves that leymourtache is not genuinely anxious to reach an acceptable settle
ment and that, in these circumstances, unless he is willing to waive his suggestion
regarding Henjam, it appears useless to continue negotiations for the proposed
Tieaty of Friendship. There are, however, strong objections to the adoption of
^thys course. The absence of adequate legal justification for the presence of the
^British naval depot in Henjam renders it impossible to continue to use the depot
against the wishes of the Persian Government. If, then, the Persian Govern
ment press for withdrawal, there is no possible ground for a refusal to comply
with tneir wishes, and all that can be done is to endeavour to obtain sufficient
notice to make alternative arrangements elsewhere. To break off treaty negotia
tions owing to the Persian attitude regarding Henjam would not improve the
position for, m the event of a rupture of negotiations, it would still be necessary
foi His Majesty s Government to comply with the Persian Government’s desire
that the depot should be removed elsewhere.
^ 10 . It will be seen that Mr. Hoare suggests that the question of Henjam
should be dealt with by notes, to be exchanged simultaneously with the signature
of the treaty, under which His Majesty’s Government would agree to withdraw
from Henjam, and the Persian Government, on their side, would grant sufficient
time for alternative arrangements to be made elsewhere. Mr. Hoare has
explained semi-officially that he might try to arrange for this final note from the
Persian Government to contain an assurance that the units of the Gulf Squadron
would still be welcomed at Henjam for recreational purposes in the course of
their cruises, and he would also endeavour to secure an interpretation of the term
recreational purposes, in a semi-official letter from Teymourtache, as meaning
that the canteen, club and football ground could be retained.
H; While there can be little doubt that, if the Persian Government insist
on a withdrawal, it will be necessary to accept a settlement on the lines proposed
by Mr. Hoare, if this can be arranged, it might be possible at the outset to
approach Teymourtache on somewhat different lines in the hope of reaching a
more satisfactory solution. Mr. Hoare might say that negotiations have been
proceeding for years on the assumption that Teymourtache was prepared to agree
to a lease of Henjam; His Majesty’s Government now wish to hold his Highness
to his previous agreement to come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement on
this question. If, however, his Highness does not wish to enter into a formal
lease, such as that hitherto under discussion, His Majesty’s Government will be
satisfied if he will agree that His Majesty’s ships shall for a certain period of
years enjoy the facilities for recreation and refuelling at Henjam which they
have enjoyed in the past; and it would be well if Mr. Hoare were in a position
to add that the forthcoming arrival of the new Persian navy seemed to render it
possible for His Majesty’s Government to repay the Persian Government for
facilities granted to His Majesty’s ships at Henjam by providing facilities,
though of a somewhat different kind, for the new Persian navy. For example,
Mr. Hoare might point out that the Persian Government will inevitably find that
their new warships, if they are to be maintained in a seaworthy condition, will
require the normal docking facilities at certain stated periods, and that, until
the Persian Government have provided such docking facilities for themselves, it
might be convenient for them to be allowed to use such facilities as are available
in Indian dockyards. Although the Secretary of State is not confident that this
line of approach would offer a satisfactory solution, he considers it desirable at
least to explore the possibility of offering the Persian Government advantages
for their navy, such as docking facilities, and I am to enclose a copy of a letter
which has been addressed to the Admiralty on this point.
12. Finally, as regards the General Treaty negotiations as a whole, it seems
necessary to decide which are the essential points upon which Mr. Hoare should
stand firm. If, as explained above, it is not proposed to accept as a basis of
negotiation the offer of the South Persian air route as the sole advantage to be
gained by His Majesty’s Government from the treaty, and if it is impossible to
obtain as a result of the treaty the facilities required at Henjam, it seems
necessary to concentrate on the other British desiderata enumerated in
paragraph 3 above. More especially, it seems desirable that the Persian claims
to Bahrein , Tamb and Abu Musa should be finally disposed of as a result of the
general settlement. The Persian claim to Bahrein, in particular, however
ill-founded it may be, is inconvenient on account of the considerable expenditure