File 522/1922 Pt 7 'Bahrain: Persian claim to sovereignty; Persian Treaty negotations 1929-1930' [‎145r] (294/1126)

this point that Teymourtache said something to the effect that he had detected
m London an atmosphere of suspicion against the Persian Government This
gave me an opportunity of saying that I was fully aware before I came here that
the atmosphere was not good; I had, therefore, represented to His Maiestv’s
Government after I had been here a short time and there seemed to be signs of
improvement that to my mind a treaty such as we had in view should be the
consummation of, rather than the introduction to, good relations and I had urged
that the resumption of negotiations be deferred until the habit of neighbourliness
on both sides had eliminated all traces of the past mistrust. I had, however been
over-ruled, largely, I thought, as the result of his visits to London. He could,
therefoie, safely conclude that His Majesty s Government were keenly anxious
to reach an agreement. Teymourtache replied that he did not see that anything
could possibly have been gained by a postponement of the negotiations, and asked
how I thought that a spirit of confidence could be created while major issues were
outstanding. I said that I thought there were a number of ways, instancing the
joint survey of the Baluchistan frontier, which we could perfectly well have
refused, and from which I rather fancied we had nothing to gain and possibly a
little to Jose, and a possible arrangement for dealing with frontier district
rebels ” in that region. Teymourtache agreed profusely that matters were
easier now, but did not agree that negotiations should have been deferred.
This led Teymourtache to wonder whether a frontier rectification in
Baluchistan might not provide the necessary “compensation” for Bahrein,
though he hastened to say that the East was not the favourite part of the Empire.
I told him that I did not know in the least, but anyway it would be quite useless
to make any suggestion if the Persian attitude on the subject of Hen jam was a
completely non possumus one, as his language seemed to indicate. As regards
Henjam, I, having lived a good deal in the East, could understand his objections
to a lease, though I doubted whether other people, e.g., the First Lord of the
Admiralty, who was a person of some importance in the councils of His Majesty’s
Government, would be able to; but I could not understand, and quite certainly
people in England would not understand, why the Persian Government should
object to affording, in the full exercise of Persia’s sovereign rights, the facilities
for which we asked in consecration of a treaty of friendship. A refusal of these
facilities would quite inevitably be regarded in England as a signal proof of
unfriendliness and the feeling engendered would render it quite certain that no
further ‘ ‘ compensation ’ ’ for Bahrein would be entertained for one moment. In
fact I should regard it as a waste of time to try and think of something.
Teymourtache replied that though he did not admit that the potential charge of
unfriendliness was justified he quite understood that it would almost inevitably
be made, and he said positively that if Persian national sentiment could be
satisfactorily appeased over Bahrein a settlement regarding Henjam could be
reached. (Throughout the discussion of Bahrein I was insistent that he wanted
window-dressing and nothing else and he did not deny it.)
With regard to Henjam specifically, at one time he talked of the practical
difficulties of meeting our wishes, rather suggesting that they lay in the high
handed attitude adopted by the naval store-keeper there. I gave him recent
instances, i.e., the “ Khuzistan ” and “ Baroda,” to convince him that this was
very far from being the case and so he reverted to the line that Henjam would
present no serious difficulties, but for the irregular situation in the Gulf which
was a relic of the past and which made Persian opinion particularly sensitive
and, indeed, suspicious. Persia had suffered severely, more especially during the
When I said that we had not taken the initiative in violating Persia’s
war.
neutrality he admitted it readily enough, and also admitted that we had at no
time been guilty of aggressive action against Persia, but said that the effect on
Persian opinion of the abandonment of Persia’s interests by the conclusion of the
Anglo-Bussian Agreement of 1907 had been just as disastrous as any act of
aggression and created the mistrust which had lasted ever since. I told him that
I quite understood all this, but that we were engaged in removing anomalies, and
if we were successful in removing them his objections to Henjam seemed to me
to disappear.
Throughout the conversation whenever I pressed the discussion of Henjam
he was inclined to switch off to Bahrein as soon as he could, and he kept saying
that he wondered how a settlement over Bahrein could be reached. I reminded
him emphatically that he had said in London that he foresaw a quick and easy
[497 g—1] 1 b 2