Memoir of the Career of Thomas Edward Rogers [‎27r] (53/118)

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I have always liked his style and was not surprised to hear him ask with mock
gravity whether I was the local flogger of natives. It was useless to tempt
further sallies by stressing our most friendly and studiously correct relations
with the admirable and much respected Shaikh of Bahrein.
On one of my tours from Bushire to supervise food grain distribution a
message reached me from Nasir Khan, head of the Qashqais, suggesting a meeting
at his temporary encampment near by. This posed a problem. In my view the
belief on the British side that Nasir was collaborating with German agents
suggested that we should make some countervailing contact with him. But the
Embassy at Teheran which obviously had the principal responsibility for relations
with the Persian Government (though the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. through Delhi could properly
have some say in decisions) would be likely to oppose any appearance of undermining
the authority of that Government which considered the leaders of the large
Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes as dangerous overmighty subjects. Indeed, the now
deposed Shah (conducted into exile, by the way, by a senior Political, Sir Claremont
Skrine) had done much to reduce their former semi-independence. My natural
inclination was to think, in the manner of the ICS in admittedly very different
circumstances in India, of making contact with would-be overmighty subjects and
taking decisions in the light of the situation on the spot as one saw it. I
therefore saw good grounds for not shunning Nasir in the present case.
In general terms the view of the Embassy in Teheran, backed by the Foreign
Office, could not be faulted. But here was a rare chance, unlikely to be repeated,
where contact could be justified vis-a-vis the Persian authorities on three grounds.
First, we had not sought it: second, only chance proximity had made it possible:
thirdly, given tribal notions of honourable or even decent conduct, to reject it
would appear a gratuitous snub likely to make Nasir still less sympathetic than
he was to the allied cause and make a future approach more difficult later if the