'Unrest in Northern Mesopotamia (Kurds)' [‎68r] (135/206)

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From Baghdad, 26th May 1910.
{Repeated Viceroy, Teheran, Constantinople, Cairo, and Aleppo for Noel. Copy to
General, Baghdad, who has approved before despatch.) /
(Received 27th, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 5867. Kurdistan. My telegram dated 12th May -and General, Baghdad,
telegram to-day.
On 22nd May it was reported that serious troubles had broken out at
Sulaimaniyeh, Sheikh Mahmud having seized reins of Government, looted treasury,
and imprisoned all British officers and staff, after defeating our Kurd Bashi bazouk
levies. Some casualties among British officers and men reported, but not yet
confirmed. Outbreak was wholly unexpected locally as Sheikh Mahmud had been
steadily losing ground and was becoming personally unpopular with influential
elements. Air reconnaissances showed Sulaimaniyeh in hands of hostile Kurds.
Halabja, Koi (? Kevi), Rania all quiet on 24th May.
Telegram from Consul at Tabriz, dated 23rd May, reports increasing gravity of
(? Turcoman) Kurdish agitation there, and reports attack on Simko, from whom I
have recently received cordial letters, and whose close friend, Saiyid Taha, is now
our guest at Baghdad. Telegram from Senna of same date shows Sheikh Mahmud
has relied mainly on support from Persian Kurdistan, whence some 1,500 men
have come to his help. It also appears clear his action is direct outcome of
movement for independence of Kurdistan, including Persian Kurdistan, which, as
already reported, has been growing for some time past.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has already despatched mixed column to
Chemchemal to hold main pass and strong force has left Tigris for Kirkuk.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and I are considering possibility of
occupying Sulaimaniyeh as a source of present trouble on the following grounds : —
(1) It is certain that powerful tribes in this area, who are now standing aloof,
will be drawn into movement, which is purely anarchistic, unless we at
once suppress Sheikh Mahmud. Meanwhile, two most powerful groups,
viz., Pishdr, west of Sulaimaniyeh, and Jaf, east of Sulaimaniyeh, have
offered fullest co-operation with us in suppressing him.
(2) It may be taken as certain that, unless promptly suppressed, movement will
find an echo in Persia and in Mosul, and may make military position in
those areas serious. It will also have effect in Mesopotamia.
(3) Failure to suppress it will probably encourage similar anarchistic movement
in north-west Persia and northern Kurdistan to great detriment of
important Allied interests there.
(4) Only means of suppressing movement is to occupy Sulaimaniyeh. This step
would be popular locally, where our administration (is) rapidly gaining
popularity with all except M. and his entourage, whose last effort this is.
(5) Numerous communications received show that movement at present by no
means commands general support and can be suppressed by military
action.
(6) It will be borne in mind Sulaimaniyeh district occupies peculiar position,
vis-a-vis, Baghdad and Mosul Vilayets and Persian Kurdistan, which
makes its retention under effective control of more importance than any
other part of Kurdistan.