Memoranda and papers by General Herbert Vaughan Cox, Military Secretary to the India Office, regarding British military strategy in Central Asia and the Middle East [‎196r] (391/460)

Afghan Government so long as he remained at its head. But, rightly or
wrongly, we have not taken that line. We have acted on the principle of
dealing with the de facto Amir, whatever his personal record, and are at this
moment engaged in a correspondence with Amanullah, which virtually commits us
‘o negotiate with him, and consequently—provided the negotiations are successful
md he remains on his throne—to live in amity with him hereafter. But it
is clearly not desirable, or even tolerable, that Amanullah should escape all
punishment, or that he should be allowed to slip into his predecessors’ position
without some expiation for past misdeeds. One obvious penalty is to limit the
amount of his subsidy, at any rate for a probationary period. There can be no
question in any case of giving him the additional two lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees granted to Habibullah
in 191.5 for the specific purpose of maintaining neutrality. It is suggested that
his subsidy should be fixed, for a period of five years, at not more than 12 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees , and
that any subsequent increase should be made expressly contingent on his good
behaviour. Secondly, the style “ His Majesty,” conferred on Habibullah in 1907,
should not be granted to Amanullah, now or hereafter. No hope of future recon
sideration should be held out to him. Thirdly, the right of maintaining an Afghan
postmaster at Peshawar should be permanently withdrawn. Fourthly, if the above
is considered insufficient, the Amir might be required to make public profession of
his penitence in some formal manner, e.g., by sending an envoy to the headquarters
of the Indian Government to tender a formal apology to the Viceroy. He might also
be required to expel from Afghanistan, within a given period, such persons, whether
Afghan subjects or foreigners, as the Government of India may desire to see removed ;
and at the same time to hand over to the British authorities certain specified indi
viduals, such as Mohendra Pratap and Barakatullah.
14. The question of territorial compensation has been raised by Sir Louis Pane,
\\ ho presses, mainly on strategical grounds, for the permanent occupation of Dakka.
The Department ventures to hope that this suggestion will not be adopted. We cannot
afford, in the present excited state of Muhammadan feeling, to give the impression
that we are seeking territorial aggrandisement at the expense of a Moslem State. The
local advantages of occupying Dakka may be great; but local advantages would be
dearly bought at the price of action tending to justify, in Muhammadan eyes, the
clamour of our Pan-Islamic detractors.
Political Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
20th June 1919.
J. E. S.
Note by Secretary, Military Department.
I am asked to make any remarks which occur to me from a military point of
view on the above Note dated 20th June, on the question of future relations with
A fghanistan.
1 am in complete agreement with that part of the paper which deals with the
future, viz., paras. 8 to 11. I would add to the arguments put forward for alternative
(•ii) and against (i) or (iii) that, until we know a great deal more of what the Russia
of the future is going to be, and to want to do, we should be unwise to leave Afghani
stan alone at the mercy of a possibly ambitious Russia, or to establish a Protectorate
that it might be inconvenient to have to enforce or that might cause permanent
friction between us and the New Russia. Incidentally, I cannot imagine a less
profitable country to “ protect ” than Afghanistan—a veritable wasps’ nest.
As regards paragraph 12, there will be practically no use in restrictions as to
importations of arms from the south and south-west while they can enter uncontrolled
from the north and north-west; in fact, I am not at all sure that it would not do
harm as leading to development of trade and trade routes from the north into
Afghanistan instead of our direction.
{-) The matter of railways and telegraphs should, I agree, be left alone unless
the Afghans want them.
(5) the finishing of the demarcation of the frontier is a very important matter.
Doubt on such things always leads to trouble as in the present case.