'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎114v] (231/256)

at point 26 miles north of Nasiriyeh under cover of a reinforcement from kut-al-Amara <»1
five truns and five fresh battalions. While not aeee])tin<; this report without verification, 1
consider it emphasises great desirability of denying to enemy the use of so important a river
iunction as Kut. Gorringe is investigating report by means of aeroplane and other methods.
Falling waters in Hammar is causing great difficulties in case of larger river steamers, one
of which has been aground for three days.
>
No. 16J
Viceroii to Secreta nj of State for India, dated 'hth July l!M5.
' ^Xow'that Nasiriveh has been occupied the occupation of Knt-al-Ainara is considered by
us to be a strategic necessity. Kut-al-Amara is only four miles beyond limit of Hasra
Vilayet; it commands the lower reaches of the Tigris and also toe Euphrates bv wa\ ol
Shatt-al-Hai and its occupation will facilitate the reinforcement of our position on either river
and also enable us to control the powerful Beni Ban, tribe and effectively safeguard the oil
fields against agression from the Tigris. Once securely m possession, we could pvobabh
reduce '"materiaBv our garrisons at Nasiriyeh and Amara and thus economise our troops.
Nixon has owing to sick found it necessary to demand reinforcements He is also I,eiun
directed to despatch an Indian battalion to Bushire. In order to strengthen Nixon for the
purpose of securing Kut-al-Amara, we consider 28th Brigade should be moved from Aden
to Force “ D.” when this brigade can be spared from Aden. We agree with A ounghusband
that an advance to Hahej should not be undertaken for the present It will therefore be
possible to spare 28th Brigade from Aden shortly m order to assist Nixon in the capture ot
Kut-a 1-Amara. after which the brigade could again return to India W e request your
sanction to our authorising Nixon to capture Kut-al-Amara and to employ LMh Brigade in
the operation, which we calculate would begin not later than early m September and should
be completed in time for the 28th Brigade to be back in Aden by November.
No. 169.
General Ni.ivn to Secretary of State for India, dated 28/// duly B»lo.
' Euphrates * Bine. Kvacuation of sick and wounded from Nasiriyeh has commenced.
Navigation of Hammar Bake presents difficult problem. Transfer of units back to 1 igns
Bine being carried out as shipping becomes available. Gorringe s experience leads him to
recommend strongly more machine guns to keep down casualties, which \\eie hea\\ on - ■ h
Julv. On 20th instant I asked for 56 more Maxims of latest pattern, and Iroin the experience
of 24th July 1 request they may be sent me as soon as possible, but they should be ot the new,
light pattern.
No.^78*
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20/// duly tdlo.
(ie pidvate. R Your private telegram of the 26th instant. I communicated your message to
Nixon. He now asks me to convey following to you ,
u () lir feelings of gratification at the appreciation expressed by the 8,ecreturn ot Statt weie
never stronger than'they are to-day, and Horringe, his troops and myself one and all
heartily thank you for your very kind and inspiriting message.
N0.>?Hs
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 30//i dnhj 19B).
' ^Reference^ Mesopotamia operations. As neither Younghusband's Brigade nor other
reinforcements are available a cautious strategy is imposed upon us . .
I recognise fully strategic importance of Kut-el-Amara, but please let me know how it is
irronosed to distribute troops after its capture.
If Kut-el-Amara is held in foice, it seems unlikely enemy will take any t u,•ther otlen^e
on Euphrates side, but will concentrate on Tigris line, therefore, we must be strong at Kut.
Assuming that defeated Turks are retiring by Shatt-el-Hai, do you think that an} ad\an age
is gained bv retaining troops in so unhealthy an outpost as Nasiriyeh, with w Inch communi-
catfons are* difficult, especially when river falls ? Have you considered advisability of
withdrawal from there and concentration of strength on I igns side . . , . .
Bushire and Ahwaz must continue to be held as outposts for political reasons, but would
it not be well that remainder of troops should be at Basra and along I igris .
Please let me have your views before any decision is taken.
No. ^
His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to Sir K. Grey.'dated Aid Anyust 191,).
(Te pSm l situatim,. His JUjMtvs C.„,sul-Ge„er»l a. Ispahan 1ms repmtrnmha, he has
reason to believe that there will shortly beesome 300 Germans and Anstrianjj^^tter being
prisoners of war escaped from TranscaspiaJjassembled m that town. I he} an campe 1 a
siort distance outside the town and poss^l of large quantities of r, ties am> ammunition
besides machine guns, bombs and a wireless telegraphy apparatus, and allow no one to
approach their camp. Thev have also considerable number of Mutalnd m their pa}. > mall
parties of Germans are cmitinuallv coming rid Kermanshah and amongst them piuba .l}
Oppenheim Germans have more than once interrupted Indo-European Department w„es