'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎92r] (186/256)

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(Enclosure 1 in No. 5 .)
From Secretary of State to General Nixon, Basra, Sth October 1015.
(Repeated to India.)
P, \\ hat addition (o your present force will enable you with confidence
to occupy and hold Baghdad ? holograph direct and repeat to India.
Very urgent.
(Enclosure 2 in No. 5 .)
From General Nixon, 8th October 1915.
(Repeated to General Staff.)
No. 6 .
From Viceroy, ( dth April 1916.
P.— With reference to our telegram of the 4th instant. General
Officer Commanding Force “ 1) " telegraphs as follows :—
“ The appreciation referred to in the entry in the General Staff Diary,
Gth Division, is probably the following telegram :—
“ ‘3rd October 1015, to Major-General, General Staff, Kut.’
“ By Reilly’s report you will see he had just left for Kut, and that the
chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish forces, which have by now taken
up a position at Sulman Pak no longer exists; that position is astride the
Baghdad Road and the Tigris, and is estimated to be 6 miles of entrenchments.
It is also probable that Baghdad has sent them reinforcements. See report
by Reilly which gives 6 barges, 3 more steamers, 1 mahela, 105 bell tents,
Kc., also many men and many stores, &c ; another steamer 5 miles west of
Sulman Pak.
“My opinion, if 1 may be allowed to express one, is that up to the battle
at Kut, our object has been to occupy strategical position of Kut, and to
consolidate ourselves in the V ilayet.
“ Ctesiphon is now held by the defeated Turkish Forces. Should it not
be considered politically advisable by Government to occupy Baghdad at
present on account of doubtful situation at Dardanelles, and possibility of
our small forces being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from
Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. , which would compel us to ret ire down a long line of communications
teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would
become active on hearing of our retreat, then 1 consider that on military
grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut. 'The sudden (?) fall of
water, which made our advance in ships most difficult, slow, and toilsome,
upset our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of Turks while they were
retreating in disorder. If on the other hand it is the desire of Government
to occupy Baghdad, then my opinion is that unless great risk is to be run,
it is absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut should be carried out
methodically by two Divisions or one Army Corps or by one Division
M.s. 210 . A 2