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Turks have already made arrangements for transporting these reinforcements to Baghdad
by rafts from Mosul, and reports have been received of a forthcoming concentration via
Euphrates, but this latter requires confirmation. Time taken to concentrate rear on head of
a division moving thus is calculated at between a fortnight and three weeks. Any advance
from Baghdad by land on part of Turks would necessitate collection of transport.
Taking new divisions as arriving at full strength of nine battalions at 900 each, and
consisting of Ottoman Turks who do not desert, the enemy’s strength in the Baghdad concen
tration area may amount to 27,500 men and 55 guns by second week in December, by which
time it is estimated that Townshend’s force can be increased to between 11,000 and 12,000.
By end of February Turks might assemble 50,000 men and 84 guns. This is deduced from
War Office telegram No. 9977 cypher M.O 6 dated 16th November, and Chief of General Staff’s
telegram No. S. 27,496/M. 63, of 16th November, on the assumption that the Turks can so
afford to disregard the Bussians as to allow for the re-grouping of their forces on the lines
indicated in latter telegram.
We ourselves shall not be in a position to attack Baghdad until the beginning of March
at earliest, and then with some 40,000 men with 114 land guns exclusive of 7,000 to 8,000 men
on our lines of communication.
Above numbers include Lahore and Meerut Divisions complete ylns 34th and 35th Brigades
from India plus extra cavalry regiment. British drafts and all artillery promised. To effect
above I have assumed that my fleet of ships will have been reinforced at a very early date by
at least the additional craft recently asked for from India, and about the arrival of which I
am momentarily expecting to hear. The ruling factor in the rapidity with which our concen
tration can be effected is the supply of additional river transport. Had we succeeded in
seizing Baghdad the question of additional ships would not have been so acute, as we could
have brought up reinforcements by degrees with a smaller number of ships.
To summarise. Provided that my river transport is immediately augmented to the maximum
extent possible, and that all promised reinforcements plus drafts to make good present wastage
reach me by middle of January, 1 consider that 1 shall be in a position to capture and hold
Baghdad by the middle of March 1916 without any additional troops. Should the Russians
be able to co-operate with me, my task will be proportionately simplified, and I ask for
information as to how far I may expect such co-operation. As T feel confident of capturing
Baghdad, I do not propose to discuss the alternative of taking up a defensive line in rear.
No. 232.
Sir John Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 27fh November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
26th. Tigris line: Aeroplane reconnaissance evening 25th reported Turks were moving
forward from the Dialah position in two columns, one along Tigris left bank and the other at
turning distance inland, while hostile cavalry brigade menaced Bustan. General Townshend,
to avoid being pinned in, skilfully withdrew during the night of 25th-26th to Lajj, where he
is entrenching on the river and will demonstrate by the right bank. Air reconnaissance
afternoon 26th reported Turks re-occupying front line trenches lightly and some 10,000 troops
moving in the area between Dialah and Ctesiphon.
No. 233.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Tigris line : General Townshend reports 27th November that enemy estimated at 12,000
advancing from Bustan and that he may have to fall back on Aziziyah.
No. 234.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Tigris line: General Townshend withdrew his force unmolested during night of 27th-28th
November to Aziziyah. Air service reports morning of 28th that large camps being at
Ctesiphon. One division infantry with one cavalry and one artillery brigade reported moving
on Lajj. Another column reported to be moving north and east of Lajj. General Townshend
does not anticipate that enemy will advance beyond Zeur. Should they do so, he will retire
on Kut to cover concentration of reinforcement. Reports indicate possibility of hostile force
from Jassan moving to Sheikh Saad.
No. 235.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 29th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
General Townshend is still at Aziziyah, 29th November, unmolested. He proposes to
withdraw to Shadi and cover concentration at Kut. Small mixed reconnaissance force
formerly at Bedrai has temporarily interrupted my communications near Sheikh Saad.
General Headquarters remaining at Kut.