'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎86r] (174/256)

45
of Ikghdad-bamami railway in that it would prevent any possibility of surprise attack on us.
He considers that all our interests lie in our holding Baghdad, but recognises that without
addition our present forces might be driven out of it, and that this might involve a very
dimcmt and dangerous retreat down the river. Shortly, he is opposed to a raid on Baghdad
followed by a withdrawal. He is strongly in favour of holding Baghdad if reinforcements
are forthcoming. It they are not forthcoming, he prefers safety of Kut-el-Amara position.
He feels, however, that present military situation is such that it may at any time become
necessary to occupy Baghdad even with our existing forces, and accept the risk involved.
. °' vn comment upon the Commander-in-Chiefs view is that from a political point of
view it would be disastrous to be driven out of Baghdad.
(M) Remain in a defensive position at Kut-el-Amara. This is a course that does not
appeal to us, for it shows weakness which will be recognised both by Turks and the tribes,
and may force our hands into advancing after all.
Having placed these alternatives before you I leave the question with confidence for His
Majesty’s Government to decide, but I trust that the decision will be in favour of the first
alternative.
No. 203.
Secretary nf State for India to Viceroy, dated 2lst October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of 21st October. Baghdad advance. Report of Combined
Staffs estimates that Nixon has only some 9,000 Turkish troops and some irregulars to deal
with for next two months ; that Turkish forces may be somewhat increased by end of year,
and they might conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by end of January and even larger figures
during 1916. They consider that if reinforced by two Indian divisions from PranciT he might
with assistance of river flotilla face risk of attack by 60,000, but there would remain possibifity
of enemy receiving further reinforcements at later date. Staffs hold, therefore, that it would
be unwise from purely military point of view to occupy Baghdad unless military authorities
have power to withdraw troops at once without regard to political considerations if military
exigencies make this necessary. The War Office would give the two Indian divisions, but
could not under any circumstances spare further reinforcements, and are doubtful of their
capacity even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think
Baghdad can be taken easily and held for some time, but as explained above it might become
untenable later. At present moment it seems that German attempt to break through to
Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain.
Persia seems drifting into war on German side whilst Arabs are wavering, and unless we can
offer them great inducement will probably join Turks. We are, therefoi-e, in great need of
striking success in the East both to check Persian movement and to win Arabs. It is
suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we favour
creation of Arab State independent of Turks, and that we shall be prepared to consider future
disposition of Baghdad in connection therewith. Is this practicable r* Unless you consider
that possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations
seem to us to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.
No. 204.
War Office to Commander-in-Ghief, India, dated 22nd October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
An appreciation of intelligence in the Near East is as follows :—The Germans appear to
be likely to succeed in their attempt to get through to Constantinople, their object being to
supply munitions to enable the Turkish Army to drive us out of Gallipoli rather than
to disseminate their own iorces by tying up troops in the Balkans. Some 200,000 Turks
would thus be freed and rendered available for operations against us either in Egvpt
or in Mesopotamia or in both. If our threats on Constantinople from the Dardanelles cease,
the consequent Turkish movement on Mesopotamia could only be stopped at Alexandretta
and the occupation of Aleppo, requiring a considerable force, would be entailed by operations
there.
No. 205.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of the 21st instant. Baghdad advance. Your description
of the situation in the Near East proves conclusively the necessity for action in the Middle
East in order to prevent if possible Persia and Afghanistan declaring against us. We accept
the calculation of the combined staffs of possible strength of Turks that may with time be
brought against us, but with x'einforcement of two Indian divisions from France we believe
that Sir J. Nixon has a reasonable prospect of being able to hold his ow r n against 60,000 or
70,000 Turks, provided that he occupies Baghdad as soon as he is ready. Although I realise
that the occupation of Baghdad is a provocation that will probably determine the Turks to
send large forces to attack us, which, however, will not be easy for them to do, and although
the bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored, I am confident that
the right policy at the present time is to take the risk and to occupy Bagdad with the least
possible delay, relying upon you to send the two divisions from France as quickly as possible
to Mesopotamia. On this understanding I propose, unless I hear from you before Monday to
the contrarv, to order Nixon to march on Baghdad at once.