'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎71v] (145/256)

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No. 76.
Chief of General Staff, India, ta Chief of Imperial General Staff, War Of ire, dated
10th December 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
From information given by tlmee Turkish officers captured on 7th December at Mezera,
we gather that after the action of 4th December the Turks were reinforced by some infantry,
2 guns, 160 gunners and 200 sappers. The combined Turkish strength at Mezera and Kurna
was about 3,000, and consisted of gendarmerie Depot battalion, and nine guns. Seven of the
latter have heen disabled or captured. The Turkish garrison at Basra has mostly retired
towards Suk-es-Shuyukh and Naziriyah. The Turkish forces at Bagdad, when the above
prisoners left there about 25th November, consisted of 4 Gendarme battalions, 1 Nizam
battalion, 600 cavalry, and some Held and mountain guns under the command of Abdul Hamid
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. . Some guns and four battalions are said to be en route for Constantinople. One
battery, two battalions regulars, all 12th Army Corps, together with some Kurdistan
tribesmen, were also en route for Bagdad from Mosul. On 7th September a Division went to
the North from Bagdad. There is no lack of food or ammunition according to the prisoners’
statement. r
No. 77.
General Barrett to Secretary of State for India, dated llth December 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
10th December. 1,000 prisoners arrived from Qurna to-day and were placed on board ship.
No. 78.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated \Uh December 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference telegram of 10th instant from Chief of General Staff. It may be expedient to
turn 1 urks out of Nasiriyah district, so please consider practicability of sending a force to
eject enemy and occupy district which blocks approaches from Bagdad by either right bank
Euphrates or Shat-el-Hai and which protects Muntafik Arabs from Turkish interference I
understand that Suk-es-Shuyukh can be reached by water from Kurna in two or three davs
I ic occupation of triangle Basra-Kurna-Nasiriyah would give us complete control of all
approaches to Gulf and influence Arabs on both sides of Euphrates.
No. 79.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 16th December 1914
(Telegraphic.)
i In your telegram of the 5th instant regarding Basra, it is presumed that you refer not
only to the town and its suburbs, but to the vilayet as well. It is the wish of His Mai'estv’f-
Go\ ernment that no declaration may be made of permanent annexation. Such an act would
run counter to the principle that, pending a final settlement when the war is at an end all
occupation by allies of territories conquered is provisional. Subject to the foregoing remark
the proposals for temporary administration have my general approval. With reference to the
departments mentioned m the second telegram from Sir P. Cox, it is desirable to retain as
tar as possible, the existing structure of local agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. and administration, and to observe
leniency m the collection of revenue. For the present no attempt should be made to give the
form of an Indian district to the vilayet. With reference to officers in charge, the appoint
ments of Major Scott and Mr. Dobbs for the present purpose are approved. For the time
being control of the administration will be vested in the Government of India. It is desirable
to keep down the European staff to the smallest dimensions possible, and no officer should
receive a promise of being employed permanently in Mesopotamia. Please state your views
as regards the source from which to meet the expenses of administration. Particulars
concerning tobacco Regie and public debt revenues should be sent home by mail.
No. 80.
/m , , Viceroy to Secretary of State for Indin, dated 2nd January 1915
(telegraphic.) J
Your telegram dated 14th December, regarding occupation of Nasiriyah district,has bee
considmed, and up to the present our information is not sufficient to justify a final decision
son h 1 f & l~ n \ occupation of Nasiriyah would consolidate our political positioi
south of Euphrates, but our information as to actual military value of the place is at presen
scanty and the question is complicated by recent reports from Egypt to the effect that tin
Turkish troops from Mosul and Baghdad are returning from Syria.' This may lead eventualb
to our having to face superior numbers in Mesopotamia, and as we have no troops available ti
reinforce our Division there, we must be most careful not to disseminate oui?force withou
strong military reasons by pushing troops up to place, which, once occupied, we cannot agab
evacuate without great loss of prestige. We would also remark that an advance on Nasirfval
would take us directly towards Kerbela and Holy Places, which might be used by Turks t
excite religious opposition. Further, we should like Cox to meet Bin Saood or for us to W
more from Shakespear as to his attitude and the influence he can exeH
Barrett to a ,n„ve or Meant™, are taLn^L“^!f