'Files 61/12 and 61/16 (D 80) Treaty between Bin Saud and H. M. Govt' [‎192v] (393/408)

Private Interview with Ihn Saud—and his Attitude.
8. At this stage, however, Ibn Saud requested a private and personal interview
with me, at which matters came to a head. He assured me that he appreciated fully
the reasons for the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government, and begged me to
believe that it was his earnest wish to meet their wishes in every possible way ; he
was, however, in a very delicate position, especially in regard to the Hejaz- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
frontier, and to sign the protocol at the present juncture would be to expose himself to
violent criticism not only by his enemies, but also by his friends; moreover, he had
many difficulties to contend with in his task of consolidating the position which he had
won, and he could not afford to undermine his own prestige or do anything to alienate
his friends and strengthen his enemies. In conclusion, somewhat to my surprise, he
said that he had now come to me, as a trusted friend, to ask my frank and impartial
opinion as to his best course of action, and was prepared to accept and act upon my
advice.
Sir G. Clayton's Advice to Ihn Saud.
9. I replied that His Majesty's Government had decided that they must retain
the right of manumission and were also determined to maintain the Hejaz- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
frontier as defined in the draft protocol. Unless these two points were adequately
safeguarded, no treaty was possible, and I had no hesitation in saying that, in my
opinion, a rupture would react very unfavourably on his interests and those of his
country. I strongly advised him, therefore, to meet the wishes of His Majesty's
Government. Ibn Saud accepted my advice, and appealed to me to find a way in
which the requirements of His Majesty's Government could be met with the minimum
of injury to his own position and prestige.
Slave Traffic.
10. I did not feel able to suggest any solution of the question of the slave trade
other than that of the insertion in the body of the treaty of an article by which
Ibn Saud would undertake to co-operate, as far as practicable, in its suppression,
supplemented by an exchange of letters making it clear that His Majesty's Government
would continue to exercise the right of manumission by their consular officers.
Frontier Question.
11. The question of the frontier, however, required fuller consideration. I
could, perhaps, have induced Ibn Saud at that stage to sign the protocol, and I felt it
very desirable to reach a definite settlement without delay. On the other hand, his
arguments against this course were cogent, and it was obviously undesirable to force
him into a really difficult position; moreover, I was convinced that it would be better,
in the interests of future co-operation and good relations, to ensure that the treaty
should be signed in a spirit of real amity and confidence than to leave behind me a
feeling that it had been concluded in an atmosphere of coercion as opposed to one of
mutual agreement.
Exchange of Letters re Frontier Question.
12. I therefore decided in favour of a solution on the lines of paragraph 11 of my
instructions, and informed Ibn Saud that, while still maintaining that signature of the
draft protocol was the most satisfactory course to follow, I was ready to accept an
exchange of letters such as would recognise adequately the position which His
Majesty's Government had decided to maintain. Ibn Saud held by his promise to
accept my advice on both points, and went as far as to say that, if 1 would draft the
necessary letters, he would sign them, an understanding which he duly fulfilled.
Question of Nationality and Tribunals.
13. Agreement now appeared to have been reached on all the more conteniious
questions and it only remained for Mr. Antonius and Ibn Saud's advisers to settle
various minor points in sub-committee and to draw up the final draft. During the
discussions in sub-committee, however, an unexpected difficulty arose. Ibn Saud s
advisers tried by all possible means to extend the scope of article 0 in such a manner
as to involve a complete renunciation of the Capitulations by His Majesty's Govern
ment, and finally they informed Mr. Antonius that the King would be unable to sign
the treaty unless I agreed to renounce the Capitulations or, at least, to inform him in
writing that His Majesty's Government would raise no objection if he were to abolish
them by proclamation.