'Files 61/12 and 61/16 (D 80) Treaty between Bin Saud and H. M. Govt' [‎124r] (254/408)

difficult choice. In itself, considered independently of the negotiations which had
preceded it, the draft was not so objectionable that it could not be taken as providing
a basis tor discussion. It did contain, it is true, certain stipulations which were
clearly unacceptable, as for example, in articles 5 and 8, But these could easily
have been settled by modification or deletion; and we have no reason for doubting
that, had we adopted such a course, a treaty might have been concluded without
undue depaitine rioin the letter of our instructions. Nevertheless, we thought it
our duty to resist the temptation of concluding a treaty on those terms. We felt
that the conditions put forward by Ibn Saud had to' be considered not onlv in
themselves, but also in relation to the terms which we had set out to obtain; and
not meic lv in regard to what they contained, but also in regard to what they omitted.
A close com pa i ison of his final olier with the conditions on which we had been
proposing to conclude the treaty will reveal that the acceptance of his terms would
have meant—
(a.) I he abandonment of the clause relating to the British special position in
mandated territories.
(b.) The deletion of the "national status ' clause, or the surrender of
juridical capitulatory rights.
(c.) The virtual abandonment of the clause relating to slavery.
(d.) The sine die postponement of the fixation of the Hejaz- TransJordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
frontier.
(g.) The modification in an unfavourable sense of the clauses relating to hostile
activities, to pilgrims, and to the Trucial Chiefs.
We gave the most careful consideration to the choice before us, and came
deliberately to the conclusion that we should be doing a grave disservice to the
interests of His Majesty's Government in concluding a treaty on those terms. At
the same time, we took care, in conveying our decision to Ibn Sa'ud, to avoid
anything approaching a rupture.
21. In arriving at this decision, we were swayed by one other aspect of the
situation. The initiative for the conclusion of the proposed treaty had come from
Ibn Sa'ud, and it was clear that one of his principal motives was his desire to secure
the cancellation of the onerous Treaty of 1915. This Treaty is still in force, and
the prospect of its abrogation is so alluring to Ibn Sa ud as to render him more
amenable to persuasion than he otherwise might be. Moreover, he is particularly
anxious to secure a formal and explicit recognition of his independence as ruler
of the Hejaz and Nejd. Had we concluded a treaty on the basis of his third drait,
we should have thereby, on the one hand, granted concessions which may perhaps
be described as his two main objectives in the conclusion of the new treaty ; and, on
the other, reserved for future negotiation with a probably less amenable Ibn Sa'ud
the main objectives pursued by His Majesty's Government. In other words, we
should have surrendered what we believe to be a valuable position in the strategy of
negotiation; and with regard to the points left outstanding the task of Putin e
negotiations would probably have been rendered considerably moie difficult.
22. We wish to make it clear, moreover, that we did not decide to suspend
negotiations merelv on receipt of Ibn Sa ud s third draft. Between the fl^le of its
presentation and the date on which we suggested to him that negotiations be
interrupted, seven days had elapsed during which we were busily engaged with the
Kino- and his advisers in further negotiation; for although we were firmly of opinion
that^it were better to interrupt negotiations than to conclude a treaty on dis-
advantageous conditions, yet we were anxious that no avenue of possible agreement
should be left unexplored. We had also to bear m mind the effect which an
interruption might hkve on Ibn Sand's future attitude. It was only after long and
exhaustive discussion during which we were able to gauge his real dispositions
with reasonable certainty that we decided on the ^terruption ; o^^oUatwns^
We are
a^^regre^wdl^^ou^d to'have had a favourable effect on his readiness to come to
terms In this connection we think it useful to append the letter which he addressed
to us when we took our leave of him (Annex 8), in which he expresses his regret
at the interruption. and his hope that negotiations may be resumed m the spring and
lead to agreement.