Coll 17/16(1) 'Iraq. The Assyrian Crisis' [‎437r] (884/1036)

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In making our enquiries we found ourselves at every turn faced by a political
situation so sensitive that we were unable to attain, or even pursue, our objective
without being compelled to listen to many things which were not strictly within
„ur sphere. We propose to send to your Excellency a copy of our report to the
archbishop. , . .
At every stage we made it a primary duty to call upon the local authorities
and explain the purpose of our visit. We would desire to record our sense of
gratitude for the cordial and sympathetic way in which they received us.
* The archdeacon leaves for Jerusalem on Sunday, the 25th, and I return on
Wednesday, the 28th.
Believe me, &c.
GEORGE FRANCIS,
Bishop in Jerusalem.
Enclosure 2 in No. 1.
Mr. C. J. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.
(P.S. No. 523. Secret and Personal.)
Dear Ogilvie-Forbes, Bagdad, June 25, 1933.
IN continuation of my P.S. 519 of the 22nd June, 1933.
1. On the 22nd June I had a long talk with the Bishop of Jerusalem, who
had kindly brought down the full and able report from Stafford (S. 206 of the
21st June, 1933), on the Assyrian question, which has been sent to you separately.
The bishop, who had come out to enquire in what way the Anglican and American
Episcopal Churches could assist the Nestorian Church in its spiritual life, related
to me at some length his experiences and observations during a short tour he had
just made in the Dohuk and Amadiya districts. His narrative emphasised that
there is, under the political differences, a deep emotional loyalty to the
Mar Shimun as Patriarch among the majority of Assyrians, and confirmed our
view that the premature arrest or prosecution of Mar Shimun would serve to
combine in opposition to Government many Assyrian elements that would
normally give no trouble whatever. I advised the bishop to see you, and, indeed,
happened to be with you later when he called. It was clear that he could be
counted on to use all the influence of his sacred office to induce Mar Shimun to
see reason.
2. In the course of the morning Mar Shimun rang up to say that he had
received no intimation from the Ministry instructing him to stay; he gave the
impression that failing such instructions he proposea to leave, notwithstanding
your advice. I told nim to telephone to the Minister and advised him on no
account to attempt to leave without his express concurrence^ Fortunately,
Mar Shimun at once got Hikmat Beg, who told him clearly to stay in Bagdad, and
promised, subject to the Prime Minister’s approval, to confirm the intimation in
writing on Saturday.
3. On Saturday, the 24th June, I found the Minister much calmer. He
asked my opinion on Mar Shimun’s request for written confirmation of orders not
to leave. I advised that this should be given and in the following form:
confirm my answer given to you by telephone on Thursday, that I do not wish \ ou
to leave Bagdad for the present, pending further intimation. I had gathered
that for some days at any rate Mar Shimun would not leave in defiance of written
orders; the important thing at the moment was to provide against the possibility
°1 a sudden departure, a chase and the hauling back of the Patriarch.
In the meantime constant reports were being received of the \aganes oi
^aku, son of Malik Ismail. You will remember that early in the month he had
oome into Dohuk with an armed following to ensure that he should not be detained
b .y Kaimakam. On the 14th June, 1933, he came in to see Major Thomson
similarly escorted, and was refused an interview in consequence. ^ n . b e
June Yaku was reported to be loitering on the Dohuk-Amadiya road with a
jd of armed men (variously estimated at between 100 and 300, and, it is said,
Emitted by Yaku himself to have been eighty), at the time when Malik Khoshaba
and other members of the Assyrian Settlement Advisory C ommittee weie motoring
0 Amadiya. Yaku was interviewed in turn by the Kaimakam of Ama iya,
M ajor Sargon, Rev. Mr. Panfil, and various minor officials who endeavoured to
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