Coll 17/16(1) 'Iraq. The Assyrian Crisis' [‎350r] (710/1036)

24 £
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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANN IC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PASTERN (Iraq)-
CONFIDENTIAL.
P. Z’ July 25, 1933.
. 1081/7/93]
No. 1.
’ WITH reference to my despatch N o. 449 o f the 13th July, the most important
Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon. {Received July 25.)
Bagdad, July 19. 1933.
j. during the past ten days in the story of the Assyrian crisis has been the
ev ting of maliks and other leaders called at Mosul on the 10th July by the
Acting” Governor on the suggestion of Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson. It
eemed at first that the proceedings would unfortunately be marred by the
presence and the speeches of certain uninvited guests. After the Acting
Governor had read out a detailed statement of the Government’s policy,
Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson were requested to address the meeting.
I enclose a precis of their speeches. Questions were then invited, and it soon
became clear that opinions were sharply divided. A number of questioners
proclaimed complete sympathy with the policy of the Government; others
regretted the absence of the Mar Shimun. An inflammatory speech by an
uninvited guest caused some excitement, and set the pro- and the anti-Mar Shimun
parties at loggerheads. It was felt necessary to adjourn the meeting until the
next day.
2. That same evening Colonel Stafford received a communication to the
effect that the party in favour of the Mar Shimun would decline to attend the
adjourned meeting. It was accordingly arranged that on the 11th July two
meetings should be held—one for the party against the Mar Shimun, the other
for the Patriarch’s special adherents. The first passed off quite satisfactorily, and
all present, about forty in number, expressed their loyalty to the King and their
obedience to the Iraqi Government.
3. The second meeting, which lasted for over two and a half hours, disclosed
the anxiety of certain Assyrians for the security of their tenure of privately
owned lands. Nearly all the speakers said that the presence of the Mar Shimun
was absolutely essential. It was explained to them that the Mar Shimun was
free to return immediately he signed the simple acknowledgment required from
him by the Minister of the Interior. The draft of this acknowledgment was
read out. At the same time it was pointed out that the Government were
determined not to grant any temporal power to the Mar Shimun.
4. In the opinion of Colonel Stafford the result was that those present
acknowledged that they understood the policy of the Government and promised
obedience so long as they were in Iraq. They reserved, however, the right to
consult the Mar Shimun as to whether they should remain in this country or go
elsewhere. The Commandant of Police explained that those who wished to leave
Iraq were free to do so, but if they stayed in the country they must obey the
laws of the land. At the end of the meeting, the Acting Governor requested four
representative maliks to remain behind, and suggested to them that they should
go to Bagdad to see the Mar Shimun and endeavour to bring the Patriarch
into a more reasonable frame of mind. It was, however, clearly pointed out to
them that the Government had irrevocably decided on their policy, both as
regards the position of the Mar Shimun and as regards settlement of the
Assyrians, and that this would be carried out wherever the Mar Shimun might
e At the same time it appeared that a certain number of Assyrians would
n °t apply for land until advised to do so by the Mar Shimun. Those people
" ou d suffer irreparable harm, whereas the Government would not be affected
f ma ^ s promised they would think the matter over, and eventually
ecided that Yaku, the instigator of the abortive rising of the 25th June, the
h a Luco and the Malik Andreas should proceed to Bagdad in order to explain
e ocal situation to the Mar Shimun.
Tm •?' Colonel Stafford considers that these meetings have done much good.
1 e they will not, for the moment, have greatly influenced the allegiance of
[851 bb—2;