Coll 17/16(1) 'Iraq. The Assyrian Crisis' [‎17r] (44/1036)

4th July, paragraph 3. Mar Shimun and his followers refuse to accept the League
decision and to acquiesce in the Iraqi policy towards the patriarchate; they
have, therefore, made up their minds, to revert to my earlier metaphor, to force
the cuckoo to lay its egg elsewhere; the method is drastic, but, as I said m my
first letter quoted, Mar Shimun will stick at nothing.
3. For this reason I do not think we should treat the present situation as
r '" v in isolated phenomenon. If the Assyrians go back to their homes unconditionally,
what next? Are we any better off?' Are the ultimate prospects of bloodshed any
less ? I am sure they are not. The attitude of the Assyrians, which has brought
about the present situation, will be as bad or even more obstinate; the exaspera
tion of the Iraqis will be ten times what it was. No British agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. or authority
has any influence over the Assyrians whatever. One day, sooner perhaps rather
than later, there will be an appalling flare-up whenever Christians are found in
4. I think we should, therefore, go very slowly and treat the real malady
described in paragraph 2 and not the symptom. This involves keeping the
\ssyrians of the exodus in Syria for perhaps several weeks. The balance of the
Lunn fund is only £38, but has the League got no funds for refugees ? I under
stand from M. Lepissier that the Armenians in Syria have paid back all the
advances made to them; where is that money ?
5 Since the supporters of Mar Shimun are determined not to settle down
quietly in Iraq and want to settle in Syria, the simplest thing would be to try to
prevail on the French to let them do so. If they must stay in Iraq their future
attitude must be cleared up. Mar Shimun has always blackmailed the Iraqi
Government with the threat of force in the background; the absence of
1.000 rifles in Syria improves the chances of a satisfactory solution. The
surrender of their arms by the refugees is only one method of partially toeing the
line, but there are others. If Mar Shimun gives in, the arms question might lose
its importance.
6. So much for the general problem, and the problem of the Assyrians m
Syria. In addition to these, two problems of some immediate local importance
present themselves. .
7. The first is the question of the effect of the exodus on the levies. Even
before receipt of Wilkins’s reports of the rumoured intention of some levy
officers at Hinaidi to resign, it seemed to me that it was expecting too much of
flesh and blood to think they would not be profoundly affected by the decision of
the leaders of their people to sever their connexion with Iraq and to seek a home
elsewhere. Even British officers have been known to find political circumstances
too strong for their loyalty and discipline, and to ask the question is no reflection
on the levy command. In any case the presence of the levies in Mosul is now
more than' ever a cause of anxiety to the Iraqi authorities. If a date could be
fixed some time in advance for a routine relief the lack-of-confidence objection
could be overcome.
8. The second concerns Surma and the other members of the Mar Shimun
family. We talk of the Patriarch, but we know that the real organiser of the
Assyrian defiance is Surma. She is reported to be busy spreading propaganda
against the Government and trying to induce more Assyrians to migrate to Syria.
The Mosul authorities have proposed her removal. It was urged against this at
yesterday’s conference that Mar Shimun’s detention had “ failed,” and the
expulsion of Surma would make matters worse. This appears to indicate a
fundamental misconception as to what has actually occurred. No decision was ever
deliberately taken to detain Mar Shimun in Bagdad in order to produce a given
result. The detention first came about as the result of Mar Shimun’s imperti
nences which made it impossible for the Cabinet to allow him back and maintain
their prestige. Once his detention became inevitable the logical thing would
have been to pack him with other active members of the family off to Basra or
Nasiriya. But the constant pressure of His Majesty's Government to secure the
return of Mar Shimun made further action impossible, and the result was the
unsatisfactory middle course of leaving the real source of the mischief. Aunt
Surma, in Mosul and the Patriarch free to conduct correspondence from Bagdad.
9. From the internal point of view I have little doubt that the withdrawal
of the levies from Mosul and the removal of Aunt Surma and one or two others
of the patriarchal family, would have a wonderful tonic effect (the second might
[879 i—1] b 2