File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎407v] (819/898)

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to travel between the mission in Jecldah and the Soviet representative in Rome
(M. Hakimov has asked me for a diplomatic visa to enable the courier to cross Egypt
without hindrance) lend some colour to the belief. The suitability of Jeddah for
propaganda on an enormous scale is obvious, especially when King Hussein s views
on East and West are taken into account. The mission seem to have plenty of
money, and though they have no beds they have a motor-car.
< On the anniversary of the King's accession a notice was published saying that,
while he is still endeavouring to strengthen the bonds of friendship with his great
allies, he feels it is one of his chief duties to cultivate good relations with Moslem
and other eastern countries. According to this notice, the Persian Government have
appointed a representative in Jeddah (since the war they have simply sent a consular
officer each year for the pilgrim season), and the Hedjaz Government are about to
appoint one in Tehran; negotiations with Afghanistan with a view to the exchange
of representatives are in progress; and a Hashimite representative will shortly be
appointed in Moscow". Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib tells me that he is to go to open the
“ Embassy ” in Tehran, though not, he fears, to hold the post permanently.
A sense of proportion Is not one of King Hussein’s qualities. How clumsily
he dealt with the Egyptian Government, by hiding or cutting out King Fuad’s name
which had been embroidered on the Ka’bah covering, was related in the postscript to
our July report. A few days later a little scrubby Egyptian boy, working in the
office of the “ delegate ” w hom the Egyptian Government had sent to deal with the
return of the Egyptian pilgrims, telegraphed to King Hussein that he would like to
be present at the Friday prayer in the mosque at Mecca. The King telephoned to
Jeddah and arranged for the boy to be taken to Mecca on the Friday morning in one
. of the royal cars, and he was brought back by car the same evening with a gold
watch bearing the royal arms as a present. It w T as a sad ending to this perfect day
to be discharged immediately and sent back to Egypt in disgrace.
7 With oriental suddenness Dr Naji-al-Asil has been restored to favour. There
was a very striking contrast between the penniless, rather seedy adventurer, who
arrived two months ago—unexpected, for the King, w T ho had been notified from
Suez of the date of his arrival, had not troubled to warn the officials in Jeddah—and
the plump, well-dressed, smiling young man, with pockets full of money, who went
off the other day with the Amir Abdullah for a visit to Transjordania on his way to
London. What brought about the change it is impossible to say, but it is possible
that Dr. Naji dangled unauthorised promises before the eyes of King Hussein, since
he told me the Foreign Office were prepared to make a certain concession which
there is reason to believe the Foreign Office never discussed or thought about.
However, Dr. Naji is in funds again; he has paid his debt to Messrs. Gellatly
Hankey, though not the expenses they incurred in telegraphing about his
dishonoured draft; and he smelleth the grill-rooms of London afar off.
How far, if at all, King Hussein has advanced his Caliphate ambitions this
pilgrim season is hard to determine. The jejune nature of the results of the
Pilgrimage Conference suggest complete failure. The King appears to have made
no impression whatever on the resistance of the Javanese. His cause was certainly
not advanced by a “ blasphemy ’ uttered by the Amir Abdullah to the leading
Javanese, when he compared his father to Abraham as keeper of the Ka’bah, and to
the Prophet as the head of Islam. Nor is he any nearer recognition by the rank and
file of mdians, who come to this country well primed with the anti-British and
anti-Shereefian arguments of the leaders of the Caliphate agitation in India. But
I am not convinced that those leaders are as hostile to King Hussein's claim as
they appear. Maulvi Abdul Bari is openly favourable, and he, I understand, has
great influence wuth his ex-pupils, the Ali brothers. Last month w T e reported the
recognition of the King as Caliph by Muhammad Abdul Kadir and Badshah Mian,
the latter, who is a well-known Caliphate leader from Bengal, has been treated
oy the King almost as a crowmed monarch, in return for his oath of recognition.
Fi om an absolutely trustworthy source I learn that he claims to be acting throughout
on the instructions of Shaukat Ali. This is perhaps true. The Indian Moslem
leadei s must realise the difficulty of displacing a Caliph who is actually resident in
the Moslem Holy Land, especially when the country to which they look for help,
lurkey, remains completely indifferent. On the other hand, they must realise the
advantage, for purposes of propaganda and intrigue, of having the Caliph resident
m a place where no non-Moslem can set foot, and they must know that King Hussein
is fanatical, obstinate, hostile to European influence in the East, and in other w 7 ays
also a particularly suitable figurehead for the anti-European movement Unluckily