File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎374v] (753/898)

7. Everyone here is astonished that the Hedjaz Government still stands, not least
I the Hedjaz Government itself. But the Wahabis let the occasion pass. When they
first reached Jeddah, early in January, the Hedjaz troops were in such a state of
demoralisation that capture by assault should have been easy. It was expected that a
general attack would be made about the time of the last new moon, and that such ^
attack could not but be successful, but no serious attack was made. It is now pat, 0
the new moon again, but the Wahabis do nothing but fire guns during the daytime
and at night let off a few rifles to make the defence waste their ammunition. It
would be interesting to know why the attack was never made. Possibly the wire
seemed formidable to Badawin, who had never seen such an obstacle before, and who
did not know the state of mind of the troops behind it. Be that as it may, their
failure to attack has given the Hedjaz army a better opinion of itself, and if only it
could be regularly paid it might now be willing to continue to defend Jeddah for some
time. The Hedjaz authorities talk about an advance, but this is hardly possible if any
resistance is to be expected. The army has no boots for a march, and hardly any
horses or mules in a state to draw supply carts, let alone guns. Moreover, the moral
of the Hedjaz troops is not strongly rooted enough to bear transplantation to the
desert, where there is no protective wire. One of the shereefs, Shakir, has been sent
to Yambo in the hope that he will be able to raise the tribes to attack the Wahabis at
Rabigh and even at Jeddah, but the Hedjaz Arabs are most unlikely to make any
move unless they see the Wahabis beaten and in retreat. The struggle seems, then, to
have become a war of material exhaustion, and in such a war the chances again
appear to be in favour of Bin Saud. He has lost much in prestige by failing to make
good his promises to open the Jeddah road in a few days, but he should be able to
hold on for several months in sufficient strength to prevent the Hedjaz authorities
from moving towards Mecca. It is true that the Badawin do not like long campaigns,
but they 7 maintained the siege of Hail (though Hail, it is true, is nearer home) for
longei than should be sufficient to exhaust Ali’s resources. He has only been saved
from the disaster which the mutiny must have brought about (for many other
| Palestinians were ready to follow the 150) by the receipt of £.10,000 from the ex-King
Hussein. r ^ 1 ^ s thn first contribution to the expenses of the State that Hussein has
made since he left. It has taken five months to get even this sum, which is already
exhausted, and he is not believed to be disposed to pay any more. However, the
edjaz can hang on until next pay-day (24th March), and then perhaps, by means of
promises, foi another month ; and even then a small windfall may prolong the struggle
still longer. j
8. I learn from a good source that All plans to go to Yambo if he is forced to
eave Jeddah, and to try to reach Medina and to begin the struggle again there. At
present i edma remains entirely inactive. Bin Saud has not wished to complicate the
situation by trying to seize Medina too, and the Hedjaz authorities are in control of
the town to the extent of being able to bring awav munitions from there.
k' foe notorious French convert to Islam, Major “Ibrahim” Depui, returned to
T } 6 e , J az m 1 overcber and was in charge of the French consulate for some weeks,
T lough now relieved of this duty and, he declares, without any connection with
the Jeddah consulate, he has remained in Jeddah. He states that he has been
appointed by the French Government ‘‘head of the French pilgrims’ resthouse in
Mecca and charged with a mission in Arabia.” He has just been ordered off to Jibuti,
but states his intention to return in a few weeks in order to go to Mecca to take up his
• 11 ieS ere ‘ 116 a PP 01n tment of a senior European officer as keeper of a dosshouse
is even more transparent than most of the manoeuvres with which Major Depui has
, been c0Qnecfced - fortunately for us, the greater his activity the more he damages his
j Fj'knchTonsuf f already reco * Iused and °P enI y stated 'by his compatriot, the new
Wo I 0 ' ^ fkbtW tr Y d a , few ', veeks ago to get £400 from Messrs. Gellatly,
n ey and Co. s London office, but the firm, warned by experience, consulted their
Jeddah representative, and on the latter's advice refused. Soon after this Dr. Faji
telegraphed to say that his health would not let him continue to represent the Hedjaz,
u on Receiving an acceptance of his resignation he wired that he was better.
King Ah knows too well what a large share Dr. Naji had in King Hussein's
n ransigence to have any confidence m Dr. Naji, and but for his general policy of
postponing all ques ions that are not urgent he would probably long ago have disowned
^’?s^xr tebank who represents the Hedjaz in the rest ° f Eur ° pe ’
R. W. BULLARD.