Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎13r] (26/220)

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ooiiJbTus^wH’ t0 ^ d ° Wn °? U ' * ns jf tence on strict national control (i.e.,
Statel bv allowino- S le 'l’ r ^ sent ' a,;lves °i tbe sell-determined Mesopotamian
km d' of the o hL T eS T ltn f ° f ea t section ot the 11116 to Slt 011 ‘hi railway
sertions uoW ed hf * f h ’ S plan would mvolve dividing the line into several
explicitly for ihSf managements under a joint traffic agreement, providing
such stmu^,m<,f ln , °l , rateS aild ^nd’t'ons over the railway as a whole, or
S aH tWu^7jffi,f qU d ® tranS,t ( es I >6ciall y fo r the unrestricted interchange
may deem desirable p'”'^ ag aln st any discrimination, direct or indirect, as we
iects of terHtorinl . Pl ' ovlslons <lt . th *8 kind have, in fact, figured in all the pro-
nven n-ufm i t <1 i V1S , IOn ln Asia Mmor Idtherto discussed with our Allies,
tion nf a r l eontl ' ol > tlle question of through traffic would tecome a pure ques-
the frontier-.rn a L a r? , ' eem ! nt f'T” th f 0Wners of the line 611 ‘l 16 td s.des of
on the bothard p'" '' iact - similar to that which regulates through traffic
hL shouM run I/ ''™/ l } ' oeem s essential in our interest that our section of the
rewhitTon on , 1 ? St rf u ar f ¥ osul ' J his wil1 not be obtained without great
AhvandrpPn v! •f!' 1 , Tt f has - also been held to be essential, as above indicated, that
i •i a ?f^ etta S A 0U ( ^ a ^ ree P ort - ^he Board of Trade view, however, is that
W H ‘ h' 0111 ? n ° d °i lbt haVe certam advantages for the purpose of working the
d( ? not ^g ard as essential. If so, our policy should be to try for this
1 ut making it a sine qua non, as there might be objection to making a free
P ; Basia winch would be the logical counterpart of our demand for a free
port at Alexandretta (Our historic position and record in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. might
gn.e ,”' s S0T11 f S !r 1 ° J und far resistlT1 ^ fhe application to the Gulf terminus of the control
which we should try for at Alexaudretta; but this line of argument would hardly
he icid valid by foreign Powers.) Tt might, however, be wise to provide in the
settlement that no undue preference shall be shown by the French to railway traffic
using the port. J
Ti we obtain these desiderata w r e should not need to trouble ourselves too greatlv
about the management of the other sections, as practically all our trade would go
either by the Gulf or by Alexandretta. We need not, therefore, object if the French
obtain m .the northern sectors this they would have to settle with the Italians—a
mandate similar to that which we shall obtain in the southern. We could make this
declaration of dosintei ossevient with a lighter heart, as the French would probably
be unable in practice to obtain such a mandate.
Such an attitude on our part would, however, give us material for dealing with
them, even if they refuse to be lured into Armenia; and we shall probably, after
much bargaining, be able to offer them a sufficient inducement to leave us in control
of the line as far north as Mosul, provided w^e are quite clear in our own minds
before w^e meet them that no other solution will be satisfactory to us.
The formula of self-determination should cover us from President Wilson.
The French are the real people with whom we have to settle. As already indicated,
their interests in the line have hitherto been mainly financial; they cannot pretend
to political interest in the Gulf end. If necessary, w r e can transiger on the financial
aspect, though it may be better to keep this suggestion in reserve. The Board of
Trade point out that any French or other friendly interests entitled at present to a
share in the concession must be properly compensated for expropriation. This is, of
course, incontestable. The debatable point is whether the French financiers are to
look for compensation from us or to the Germans wffiose interests they subserved.
If, then, national control is our proper aim, it is suggested that' the following
method might conciliate all parties in the attainment of it:—
1. Turkey to expropriate all the shareholdings in private hands.
2. Germany to find the money for this operation.
3. Turkey then to cede, with Germany’s assent, the wffiole concession to the
Inter-Allied Pool.
4. The Inter-Allied Pool then to sell to the Government of each State through
which the line passes so much of the line as lies within the boundaries of
that State.
The advantages of this method would be as follows:—
1. The countries ravaged by the war would get some benefit by the transfer of
the concession, as they would share the price obtained by the Pool, and
would not depend on getting the territory in Asia Minor in order to
benefit by the cession of the railway. This would help Belgium, who
is not wholly disinterested. The Baghdad Railway Company had an