File 3086/1915 Pt 6 'ARABIA: RED SEA LITTORAL – SITUATION (1915-18)' [‎140r] (27/374)

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Abyaa and the partial resumption of the caravan-traffic to Aden will corr
roborate this allegation. Since, however, he is thought to he in receipt of a
Turkish dole, and also allows a free flow of supplies to Lahej, we have
been obliged to withhold his stipend, and to lay an embargo on his port
of Shukra. He has been invited to Aden to state his case and prove his
friendliness, but he is not expected to comply. liis position on the sea
coast, and the fact that Shukra is the chief inlet for trade from Aden to
the countries up north and east has generally inconvenienced our friendlies
inland. In this lies the real significance of the Fadli’s defection to Lahej.
To palliate the difficulty we have allowed certain goods, under guarantee,
t,o go to Shukra for the use of the tribes ab'.ve, but the supply is
necessarily very restricted, so as to guard against Arab cupidity, and transfer
of some of these goods even to the troops at Lahej. It is not reasonable to
trust to the display of the outraged feelings of our friendlies against the
Fadli Sultan, and the net result of our action will be resentment against
the authors of a policy, which has failed to difi'erentiate between friend
and foe. The genius of the Arab is to defend his own hearth and home,
and he has a marked disinclination to unite against a brother Sultan*
He may fall back on the pious reflec’ion that all is Gwd’s will, but he will
think little of the Government, which cannot remedy the situation. The
Sultans have little power over their armies, and it is these rather that direct
the Arab policy.
The tribesmen of 13ani Kasid would have resented a curtailment of their
supplies ex Aden. Here the Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. intervened, and sagely arranged a three
months’ truce between the Fadli and th^se of A1 Kara, and between the
Fadli and his recalcitrant tribesmen of Haidara Am Mansur, a clan who
were the first to hasten to the Turkish overtures.
That a Turkish Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. could succeed in reconciling, even temporarily,
tribes so long at variance is a tribute to Islam’s success, where we have always
failed. This will be the interpretation by Arabs generally, and is detrimental
to our prestige.
There is only one way of counteracting the ill effects of this Turkish
incursion, and that is by for e of arms, and, if successful, the whole trend of
Arab feeling will be revolutionised. Ko diplomacy her< after will be of any avail.
A peace vith Turkey, and a diplomatic of 1 inks will not improve
our relations with the Arabs. Our retreat from Da la in 1907 was ascribed to
superior Turkish diplomacy, and the earlier delimitation of the border did not
enhance our military prowess. We have engaged at the conclusion of the w 7 ar
to adjudicate, where feasible, between the eoniiicting claims of the Imam and
the Idrisi. Unless w r e act by force, and that successfully, none will accept our
mediation. Further, when Turks are set back by diplomatic machinery, we
shall require a very large force to bring to book Arab tribes who have not so
far been impressed with our military resources. I am sure that a march on
Lahej would draw large hordes of Arabs on the retreating Turks.
To proceed to outside spheres 1
“The raising of the standard of Islam behind Aden,” writes Mr. Archer
of Somaliland, “has not passed unnoticed in the Somaliland Protectorate **.
His despatch refers also to the bad effect of our inaction in Abyssinia.
The Idrisi Saiyid of Abu Arish is inactive, ostensibly because he lacks
gun ammunition. There is more behind his inaction. He is waiting to see
our military movements here, and on other fields He told me at Djezan the
other day that he was assured of our success in ofc ter fields, hut feared that,
so far as be himself was concerned, the Turks might be left in situ — a
perpetual pinprick to himself. This is an extra check on his activity.
The Sherif of Mecca is not to be won over solely by excess of food to tb#
port of Jeddah. He too expects action on our part, and a definite programme
besides. The Idrisi distrusts him, Saiyid Mustafa being chief witness.
• No pact is possible twixt Idrisi and Imam. They are irreconcifables, and
for well know’n causes. I do not admit the possibility of an Arab union
against the Turks. The Arab chiefs have each their game to play. They