File 3300/1916 Pt 2 'Aden News Letters:- (Jan. 1917-Dec. 1917)' [‎168v] (336/620)

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probability follow suit. But he should not expect that by giving them certain
goods and providing them with arms, they will come forward to fight on his side.
By joining^h^m they run some risk as regards their property in their country as it
will be destroyed by the Turks and Imam and their families imprisoned or killed
unless they are properly defended. What offered a great inducement to the Zaidis
to fight for the Imam all the more fiercely during the Imam-Turkish war (if it can be
called such) was the fact that the Imam used to allow them to loot Turkish districts
invaded by them and whatever monetary inducement the Edrissi gives them it
will pay him in the long run and thus by money and by diplomacy or by conciliat
ing those chiefs who are willing to come to terms with him and to help him, he will
secure great advantages not only against the Turks but also against the Imam.
Similarly the Shafai Arabs in Odeina, Ebb and other places in the Yemen, cannot
come to the Edrissi and join his standard, for the same reason, as they know that
Turkish reprisals are barbarous unless they are protected. These Arabs lack
cohesion and organization, and discontented as they are, they cannot do much
against the Turks and Imam without advice and aid from outside. The case is
different when the Edrissi appears in force in their territories. There are prob
ably not more than 1,600 Turkish troops scattered in small bodies and in certain
places from the Ibn A1 Haig territory to the outskirts of Sana and from there to
Taiz (this does not include Turkish garrison in Sana). The Edrissi fought nearly
the same number of Turkish troops during the Turko-Italian war A man
from the Ahl Hurraz who has recently arrived from Hurraz via Ghizan, tells me
that there are no Turkish troops in their province whose principal district is
Manakha which is nearly midway between Hodeidah and Sana, and he also
informs me that the Ahl Hurraz are fanatically disposed towards the Edrissi and
they hate the latter as he used to fight them before. There is another Zaidi Saiyid
called Ad-Dhuhiani, who was fighting the Imam \ ahia with Turkish support,
till 1907. He is older than Imam \ahia and claimed the Imamship for himself
but when the Turks came to terms with the Imam they could not help him. He
was once elected as Imam of Yemen.
If the Zaidi and other tribes whose services can be enlisted, join the Edrissi,
the latter will be able to extend his influence over a large portion of territory and
to get a much larger revenue. It will considerably weaken the Imam and Turks
and while giving a lot of trouble to them, it will indirectly help British operations
against Lahej and may ultimately compel them to abandon it. It may be
remembered that at the outbreak of hostilities between the relatives of Abu Ras
and Muhammad Nasir Makbil a short while ago, the Turks were compelled to
despatch some hundreds of Turkish troops from Lahej to support Muhammad
Aasir Mukbil, and I understand they are still there.
This is the most propitious time for the Edrissi, and procrastination will do
him no good. The Hashid Wa Bakeel and certain other Zaidi tribes are not and
cannot be paid by the Imam now and they have other grievances against him. That
is why the Imam is keeping a force of Turkish troops in Saada as a moral support, as
he is apparently afraid of a revolution. After the war the Imam will be able to
conciliate these Zaidis by money and other things. The plan of the Turks.
v. “ TrVf".. , gath jV 8 \°, < H Sslpate the Rdrissi ’s Power in skirmishing with
t ; L .' a ' ! o, ''VI ' :11 ‘ , u . , iU g and others and by winning over as many
tribes and Shaikhs of the Edrissi as possible till the war is over, and then they
will start a campaign against him and crush him with the aid of the Imam. In
ia case e will probably be a burden on the British. I have heard some
L t ] e ™-° ry talkln 8 about British protection. The case is
different if the Turks find him strong and powerful, even the Imam, if he is
much weakened, Will probably come to terms with him.
fi T^. ltll0Ut ri d SUCl1 t 1 ribes ’ those who are competent to judge, think that
the Edrissi is not likely to make much progress or headway. Though nominally
every able-bodied man is liable to military service in the Ghizan territory,
actually only one or two of every family are compelled to join the fighting ranks,
and this probably comes to less than 20 per cent. Unlike the Zaidis a large
portion of the male population in Edrissi ; s territory are engaged in business,
and it may be that he fears reactionary movements if most of the male population
are compelled to fight unless in defence of the places they now live in. During the