Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎235v] (473/473)

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8. Goyernment on these lines might ultimately succeed in subduing the nationalist
movement and securing the prosperity of Egypt. But the following two conditions are
essential to its success :—
(a.) The maintenance of at least 12,000 troops in Egypt for an indefinite period.
(6.) The support of the British Parliament for coercive measures for the same
period involving quite possibly many sentences of deportation or death.
9. Even if these conditions are fulfilled the success of government by repression
is not assured. We rely upon the Egyptian army for the control of the Soudan. Were
we no longer able to rely upon it, our military commitment would not be limited to the
12,000 troops mentioned above.
10. It should also be borne in mind that a certain measure of consent among the
educated classes in Egypt, even if only obtained by coercion, is essential to carrying
on the government of Egypt. There is no British civil service in Egypt as there is in
India, and a complete strike of the native civil servants can paralyse the entire
machinery of government, as was shown when it actually took place in 1919. Nor
would any constitutional machinery for legislation exist. Ministers would he supported
not by public opinion but by the High Commissioner, and would be obliged to rely
more and more on enactments under martial law.
1*1. 1 he terms given above as the irreducible minimum would not of course be
presented to Adly Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. as they stand, and he might be induced to accept something
far more favourable to Great Britain. It is suggested, for instance, that the Egyptian
Government should undertake by a certain date, say the 1st January, 1925, to provide
barracks on the Canal for the British troops, who would not proceed there until the
barracks were ready. Such an arrangement would give the Government of the new
Egypt three years in which to put their house in order, and show their ability or
inability to govern. Other modifications in our favour could probably be introduced
in the course of negotiations.
12. The withdrawal of troops from Cairo and eventually from Alexandria would
undoubtedly be attended by grave risks, but it is remarkable that the officials on the
spot are willing to take the risks involved. The views of Mr. Scott and Mr. Selby on
this subject are supported by Mr. Amos and Judge Perceval. Lord Milner is also
understood to have seen no insuperable objection to the withdrawal of troops to the
Canal zone, wffiere their water supply would be guaranteed by the fact that Great
Britain w^ould, owing to her position'in the Soudan, control the whole water supply of
Egypt.
13. I he worst consequences that could ensue tipou the concession of everything
except the “ irreducible minimum ” defined in paragraph 3 would be the gradual decay
and corruption of the Administration of Egypt, which w'ould lead to financial difficulties,
agricultural errors, the reduction of the cotton crop, conditions of life for foreigners
rendered impossible, and, perhaps, outbreaks of disorder and the massacrejof Europeans.
One such outbreak would, of course, justify the reoccupation of Egypt by British
troops, and the interval between the withdrawal and the reoccupation would be merely
so much time wasted, save in so far as Egypt and the world in general might have
profited by the object lesson.
14. The evils referred to in the preceding paragraph might equally result from
any measure of self-government that it has ever been proposed to concede to Egypt.
15. 1 he only guarantee against gradual deterioration would be the anxiety of
Egyptians to justify their independence and their increased reliance upon the assistance
of British officials.
1(>. The risk involved in the policy of repression is that the nationalist movement
which has taken firm hold on the people of Egypt may not die out lu that case we
should be faced with a problem of perpetual conspiracy in Egypt and probably also in
the Soudan, culminating periodically in assassinations and in outbreaks which in turn
would necessitate reprisals and lay the foundations of national and traditional hatred.
Tie might end hy creating another Ireland, without an Ulster, which would be a storm
centre in the Mediterranean and a perpetual menace to the Suez Canal.
17. To sum up, we have to choose between—
( .) The dangers involved in making wider concessions than those hitherto
contemplated, and
(6.) The dangers arising out of a failure to reach an agreement.
Of the two, the former would seem the less formidable.
October 14, 1921.
A. D. COOPER.
J. MURRAY.