Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎124r] (249/473)

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th« Oaral, of ^ioh the principal onee are perpetual t will
be unaffected by the charge in the status of Egypt.
But It Is to be remembered that the Suez Oanal Company^
concession expires in 1968 1 and the Canal will then fall under
the control and ownership of the Egyptian Government. In the
opinion of the Foreign Office the Convention of 1863 regulating
the Sweet Water Canal will probably he held to expire con
currently. Obviously this situation gives rise to the grave
question as to whether an uncontrolled Egyptian Government
is likely to be strong and trustworthy enough to ensure the
effioient and impartial working of this great World Highway*
It has not been thought safe to entrust the B&nubo Mouths to
the sole control of the riparian States, and the Suez Oanal
is of greater international importance than the Danube* while
an independent Igypt is likely to be a weaker State than
Roumania. It seems desirable to insert some safeguards in
the coming Treaty for ensuring the proper canal management
after 1968.
Ms regards Ihe Sweet Water Canal, on which any British
garrison will probably depend for its potable water* the
difficulty is not merely what will happen when the Suez Oanal
Company goes out of existence (although this is an important
point) but whether means oan be found to safeguard the water
supply In the meantime* since the Oanal passes through Oairc
• which will* presumably, be outside the Zone oecrpied by
British troops. The whole question of the Sweet Water-^lanal
needs very careful consideration.
IT. The Nile .
It is not quite certain whether the effect of conferring
independence on Egypt would be to render the Nile an inter
national navigable waterway within the meaning of the draft
Convention about to be discussed by the League of Nations.
This question depends on the interpretation of the definition
in the draft Convention, especially in relation to the navigable
Canal connecting Cairo with Alexandria and to the Assouan Dam.
Should an affirmative answer be returned, it will be necessaiy
to scrutinise the provisions of this Convention vezy carefUlly-
in their bearing both on Egypt and on the Sudan* especially
with regard to the right of nationals of all States members
of the League of Nations to navigate the Nile. If, on the
other hand the answer is negative* it does not seem safe to
leave the matter where it is without safeguarding the right
of British and Sudanese craft to ply on the Nile within
Egyptian territory* Probably It will be best not to rely on
the international Convention (which may or may not be adopted
in its present form) especially in view of the dcxibtful
status of the Nile as a navigable International river. Hence,
suitable clauses for the purposes indicated above should go
in ary Anglo-Egyptlan Treaty*
V. Foreign officials In the Egyptian Service .
This is not wholly or mainly an economic question but it
has a very serious eoonomio aspect. If British Advisers,
officials and employees are to be withdrawn or diminished in
number b, we ought to have stringent guarantees that they will