Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎19r] (37/473)

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admit it. The line which they may take—indeed, which some of them are already
takmg is this: “ We were prepared to give up our rights under the Capitulations,
*. a British Protectorate. But now that you say she is to be
independent, we must reconsider the position.” To that contention we have a
good answer, but it is not quite a simple one. The Capitulations have two
aspects they have a good and an evil side. In so far as they provide security
for the lives and property of foreigners, they are beneficent. But in giving to
the subjects of the Capitulary Powers a position of special privilege, in which
they are exempt from taxation and in many other respects not amenable to laws
a Pplyi n g to a ll other inhabitants of the country, the Capitulations are unjust to
-^ypt' an d a bar to her progress. It is only these latter abuses which will disappear
with the abandonment of the Capitulations. Their beneficent effects will be preserved
by the proposed treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. Under that treaty, cases in
which foreigners are interested will still be dealt with by courts in which European
judges preponderate. ‘ Laws which cannot now be made applicable to foreigners
without foreign consent will still require the consent of the British High Commissioner.
And the administration of all laws, in so far as they affect foreigners, will be under the
supervision of a British official.
Legitimate foreign interests will thus be amply safeguarded. Indeed, the effect
of the proposed arrangement is to emphasise, rather than to diminish, the responsi
bility of Great Britain for the protection of foreign rights. As far as the foreigner is
concerned, the Protectorate is completely maintained in substance, if not in name.
The answer is sound, but it may take some time and a good deal of negotiation to
get it accepted. Ihe danger is, that the objections raised by some foreign Powers may
not be bona fide objections, but mere pretexts for embarrassing us in our attempt
to come to a settlement with the Egyptians. But here again, as it seems tp
me, we may reckon on having the better elements of Egyptian Nationalism on
our side. While the fight was at its hottest, and all Nationalists were
united in hostility to British policy, it was the fashion for them to say that
they did not mind the maintenance of the Capitulations if only they could
get rid of our Occupation. And the Extremists may continue to take that line, absurd
as it is, for nothing could be more contradictory than to scream for “ complete
independence and at the same time be willing to accept a system, under which the
^Syptj an Government cannot perform the most common-place and every-day acts of
administration without the consent of a dozen foreign Powers. But, while 'this
irrational attitude may still be maintained by some of the Nationalists, it is clear
that the moderate section are now disposed to take a different line, and that,
in view of the large concessions which we are ourselves prepared to make, they
recognise the reasonableness of our claim to retain such a measure of control as will
enable us to give to foreign Powers the assurances they may justly demand
in exchange for the abandonment of their capitulary rights. The Moderates, like
Adly Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , fully realise that under the proposed arrangements the balance of advantage
will be on the side of Egyptian independence. Therefore in this, as in other respects,
the really important question is whether the Moderates can carry the day in their
attempt to conquer Nationalist opinion. The course of events in Egypt will shortly
show us whether they can or not, and the answer to that question will, as it seems to
me, be decisive as to the feasibility of the proposed settlement.
M.
September 16, 1920.