Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎172v] (350/380)

10
the present memorandum. In this text article 3 of the original draft, relating to the
arms traffic, was made more stringent, while, as a concession to Sheikh Abdullah,
article 6 was altered so as to apply to British merchandise only, and not to British
traders. Articles 7, 8, and 9 (corresponding respectively to articles 4 and 8 of the
draft), were left as they stood, but in a letter from Sir P. Cox to Sheikh Abdullah
(Appendix B), of the same date as the treaty, it was agreed, in the name of His Majesty’s
Government, that they should remain in suspense for an unspecified period. It wan also
agreed that, notwithstanding article 9 of the treaty of 1820 with the Trucial Chiefs, to
which he had now subscribed, Sheikh Abdullah and his subjects should be allowed to
retain negro slaves already in their possession, on condition of their treatment being
satisfactory. In pursuance of article 3, Sheikh Abdullah signed the draft proclamation
regarding the arms traffic (Appendix C), and issued it, on the same date, in his own name.
On the 4th November, 1916, Sir P. Cox forwarded to the Government of India
the texts of the treaty as signed, of his own letter to Sheikh Abdullah, and of Sheikh
Abdullah’s proclamation, together with a full report on the negotiations. In a telegram
to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , dated the 10th January, 1917, the Viceroy proposed that the
treaty should be ratified (25485/15720/17), and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , with the concurrence
of the Foreign Office (25485/17), signified its approval in a telegram dated the 13th
February, 1917 (35527/17). The signed copy of the treaty was accordingly returned
to Sir P. Cox by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. with three parchment copies of the English version,
and he was instructed to have the Arabic version reproduced on the margins of these
copies, to sign them himself, and to obtain the signature of Sheikh Abdullah. These
instructions appear to have been duly carried out, and the treaty was ratified on the
23rd March, 1918, by the Government of India.
*
Relation of Commitments {during the War) to the Gulf Chiefs to British Desiderata,
There would appear to be no serious conflict between the two.
The general collective assurance merely reaffirms, in the vaguest terms, our previous
undertakings to the various chiefs.
The general assurance regarding British policy towards the Holy Places, including
those in Mesopotamia, is in no way at variance with British interests or with commit
ments entered into on the same subject with other parties by His Majesty’s Government.
The assurance, given to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, that “ Basra
should never again be allowed to be subject to Turkish authority,” is practically identical
with the assurances subsequently given to the notables of Basra Vilayet by Sir P. Cox,
and again by the Viceroy of India in a speech delivered at Basra on the 3rd February,
•1915. It is also consistent with our pledge to King Husein that Basra shall be
included within the boundaries of Arab independence, while, unlike the latter pledge, it
leaves His Majesty’s Government a completely free hand in regard to the positive
disposal of Basra, so long as a restoration of Turkish sovereignty is excluded.
The special assurance to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, of which the final text is
contained in Sir P. Cox’s communication dated the 22nd November, 1914, is for the most
part a repetition, practically word for word, of the assurance of 1910, with the impor
tant exception that, in the dynastic guarantee, the stipulation that the Sheikh’s
successors must be acceptable to the tribesmen as well as to His Majesty’s Government
is omitted.
There are also two short additional clauses, and the first of these makes our under
taking to support the Sheikh’s established rights uis-d-m,9 the Persian Government more
definite, and introduces the word “ autonomy.” In effect it would make it morally
incumbent upon His Majesty’s Government to interfere in case the Sheikh’s rights were
violated by Tehran; but no doubt we should in any case take action, in such circum
stances, in our own interests, and the assurance does not commit us to take specific
action, or to carry our action further than we may think desirable at tbe time. The
most important point is that none of our commitments to the Sheikh of Mohammerah
are inconsistent with a loyal recognition of Persia’s integrity.
The second additional clause, regarding the Sheikh’s date gardens in what was
formerly Turkish territory, is a comparatively trifling matter; and since the immunity
from taxation is not specifically accorded in perpetuity, it could presumably be modified
if it became a grave embarrassment to Basra finances.
The special assurance to the Sheikh of Koweit leaves the previous relations
between the Sheikh and His Majesty’s Government unaffected, and merely commits us
to the abolition of Turkish suzerainty over him. This suzerainty was, of course,
objectionable from the British point of view, and was in effect an anomaly, since our