Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎167r] (337/380)

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Article 3.—His Majesty’s Government will not treat separately with any other
Arab Chief in the Liwa of Taiz, but will assure them, if necessary, that they “ must
be submissive to” Mavia.
Article 4.—When tlie fighting is over and Sheikh Muhammad Nasir (of Mavia)
has gained the upper hand in the Liwa of Taiz, the British Government shall then
recognise the chieftainship of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir and his independence. They
undertake to place him under their protection and to protect him from the aggression of
any European Power or from the Turks.
Article 5.—Mavia undertakes to break with the Turks from this date, to open
hostilities against them upon receipt of the first instalment of the British subsidy, and
not to desist until he has expelled both them and their Arab allies from the Liwa of
Taiz (limits specified).
Article 6.—Mavia undertakes to remove Sheikh Kayid Saleh from the limits of
the Aden Protectorate (which he had invaded a; the instigation of the Turks], and to
secure his co-operation for the objects of Article 5.
Article 7. — In case the Turks in Liwa of Taiz surrender to Mavia on condition of
being deported to some other Turkish territory, the Besioent agrees to take charge of
them and carry out such stipulation after the termination of the war.
On the 13th March, 1915, the Government of India instructed the Resident at
Aden regarding this agreement as follows (50398/15) :—
“The agreement concluded by you with the representative of Mavia is
approved generally by the Government of India. It should, however, be made
clear to Mavia that the guarantee given him under clause 4 is dependent on
the obligations under clauses 5 and G being wholeheartedly carried out by him,
and that it should also be clearly understood that the agreement can only be'
ratified on this condition.”
In a telegram of the same date (50398/15) the Viceroy informed the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
in a general way both of the terms of the agreement and of the Government of
India’s instructions to the Resident.
Relation of Commitments to the Sheikh of Mavia to British Desiderata.
Ihe Agreement of the 19th February, 1915, with Mavia is presumably annulled
by the fact that Mavia shortly afterwards joined forces v\ ith the Turks. His Majesty’s
Government may therefore consider themselves free of all commitments under this
agreement for the present, hut it does not follow that the agreement should not be
taken into account in the peace settlement.
In tiie first place there is some evidence that Mavia’s return to Turkish allegiance
was merely due to necessity. So long as the Turks occupied the Aden hinterland and
invested us within the walls of Aden town he could hardly take any other course, and it
may well be true that he has never ceased to prefer relations with us. #
And, in the second place, he might, if loyal, provide a valuable counterpoise in the
Yemen to the Imam of Sanaa, whose pretensions are very great. It would hardly be
in His Majesty s Government’s interest to allow the Imam to establish authority over
the plateau of Kataba and the Yellow Area on the coast, which are both positions of
the greatest strategical importance. A minor chief like Mavia would be preferable as
a neighbour here. If we decided to retain him, the question would arise whether we
should recognise his independence, on the lines of arth le 4 of the 1915 Agreement
(replacing the agreement by a Trucial Treaty in stricter form), or whether we should
treat his failure to observe the agreement as a ground for giving him less favourable
conditions.
The alternative would be to make him a “ protected ” chief instead of an indepen
dent “trucial chief, and to include his territory within the boundaries of the Aden
Protectorate, instead of leaving it as one of the States of Independent Arabia.
We have a free hand to do this under article 10 of the Anglo-French Agreement
of the 16th May, 1916, and it is unlikely that any opposition would be offered by
the Idrisi or King Husein, to both of whom we are pledged not to extend our
possessions in Arabia beyond the status quo. The question is almost certain to arise in
the course of future negotiations with the Imam, and lie alone is likely to offer violent
opposition.
* On the 19th August, 1915, the Resident at Aden telegraphed (116337/15):Mavia Sheikh
although with lurks at Lahej, has not actively participated against us. He would probably join us if we
advanced, and would attempt to carry out his agreement with us, lie is very anxious to become a
stipendiary of the British Government.”
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