Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎158v] (320/380)

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(C.)—Part Three. Policy.
I .—General Lines,
1. It would appear from the survey given in Parts One and Two above that the
greatest discrepancies between British commitments and desiderata are those which
arise out of the claims of Italy in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. and of France in Syria and Jezireh.
_ 2. The entry of Italy into the Green Area and Area C would be bitterly and
justifiably opposed by the inhabitants. The majority are Turks, there is an important
Greek minority, and most nationalities of the Levant A geographical area corresponding to the region around the eastern Mediterranean Sea. are represented at Smyrna; but
the Italian colony is only one among many, the Italians have no traditional claim and
no vested interests, and there is nothing to show that they are capable of looking after
the country. On the contrary, their record in colonial enterprises elsewhere indicates
that they would be oppressive and incompetent. The population would probably
oppose Italian intervention on the plea of self-determination, and are quite capable of
driving them into the sea, or at any rate confining them to a few strategical points on
the coast. As parties to the Italian claim we, and the other Allies, would suffer the
G reatest moral damage from such a situation, and the results of Italian reverses in \
ripoli have shown how dangerously the Pan-Islamic movement would be fostered by a
similar reaction against an invader on the part of the Turks in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. . It may be
added that Great Britain has important material stakes in the Green Area in the shape
of the Smyrna trade and the Aidin Bailway (the only railway enterprise in Turkey
which has paid its own way). In spite of Italy’s undertakings under the Agreement
(No. 12, see above), it is practically certain that, if the Italians came on the scene, the
Aidin Railway as a British enterprise would be doomed.
3. In l^yria (leaving the Lebanon vilayet on one side) the difficulty regarding the
French claims is equally serious. The French are not wanted by the Arabs, the Arabs
have established an effective administration there, not only in the four Syrian towns
(Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo) assigned to Area A, but in considerable portions of
the Blue Area—for instance, the Anti-Lebanon district and Latakia. It is fairly
clear that they would resist the imposition upon them of any foreign “ assistance ”
which they did not ask for themselves, and the idea of French assistance is obnoxious to
them.
As regards British interests, they are much more directly affected by our pledges to
France in this region than by our provisional pledges in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. to Italy. Area A includes
part of Kurdistan and Jezireh, and these territories—at least as far west as a line
drawn across Jezireh roughly from Jeziret-Ibn-Omar on the Tigris to Verdi on the
Euphrates—go naturally with Lower Mesopotamia, and are perhaps essential for the
irrigation and general development of that country. Again, the boundary between
Areas A and B separates the settled country east of Jordan (between Deraa and Maan)
from Syria, though the population on either side is inseparable in social relations and
political sympathy. And it also parcitions into three arbitrary sections the country ot
the Ruweilah-Anazeh tribe, whose Chief, Nuri Shaalan, is one of the most powerful
independent rulers in Arabia. If the line between Areas A and B were to be maintained,
we shoidd have the choice between carrying out this arbitrary partition (a solution
which it would probably be impossible to enforce) or allowing Trans-Jordania and the
Ruweilah country to realise their natural destiny and gravitate towards Syria. The
latter solution is indeed bound to come to pass, but if this were combined with the
enforcement of French claims under the Agreement, the result would be to carry French
influence into the heart of the Arabian peninsula, and to give France such a footing in
all tribal disputes concerning demarcation and allegiance as would make the
establishment of a British “ trucial ” system in Arabia impossible. K
4. It seems most desirable, therefore, that we should attempt, at least in these two
cases, to obtain a thorough revision of the Agreements as they stand, and this leads on
to a consideration of any contingent elements there may be in the text of the
documents. 3
In the Agreement with France (No. 11) there is nothing contingent at all, but the
Agreements with Italy (Nos. 7 and 12) both contain contingent clauses. Moreover, in
the latter agreement* (No. 12) the contingent clause refers not merely to the Italian
claims but to the whole series of Agreements regarding Turkey, and France, in
subscribing to the document in which this clause is contained, would appear to have
* It is assumed in the following- paragraphs, for the purposes of argument, that No. 12 is valid. But
if it* validity is not recognised (see footnote on p. 2 above), then the contingent clause in it falls to the
ground like the other articles, and article 9 of No. 7 alone has to be taken into account in this connection.