Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎116r] (235/380)

K** Critannlc Majesty’s Government.
This Document iQ the Property of
POLICY IN ARABIA.
(Note by India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .)
1. If the peace negotiations regarding the Middle East are not to he a failure, it
seems to me absolutely essential that His Majesty’s Government should, without
further delay, lay down for the British delegation the main lines of their policy, -l
venture to put the case somewhat strongly, because there are manifest signs of a
tendency to sacrifice Mesopotamia and British and local interests there to diplomatic
exigencies in Syria ; and at present the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. is responsible for the interests of
Mesopotamia.
2. The points on which a decision is essential are these :—
(i) The ‘Status of the King of the Hejaz. —Is he to be suzerain of the whole
Arab territory as defined in our negotiations with him and in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement ? Or is he merely to be primus inter pares ? If this
question is to be answered on the basis of local option, it is certain that
no one in the Arabian peninsula (except possibly Bin Rashid) and few
in Iraq will vote for King Husain’s suzerainty.
(ii) The Status of Iraq. —As regards this, His Majesty’s Government have
approved the proposals made in Sir P. Cox’s memorandum of 22nd April
last as the basis of their policy in Iraq. Sir P. Cox proposed as the
ideal (assuming annexation to be out of the question) “government by
“ a High Commissioner assisted by a Council, formed partly of the
“ heads of the most important departments of State, and partly of
“ representative non-official members from among the inhabitants,
foreign relations being in British hands. But “ if it is decided that
“ we should have a nominal headpiece to the administration to conduct
“ his own affairs under British guidance .... we have in the
“ Naqib of Baghdad and his family a dynastic element which would
“carry the necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad Vilayet un-
“ doubtedly, and in my opinion in Iraq as a whole. I believe they could
“ be brought to identify themselves with British interests.” His
Majesty’s Government have not decided between those alternatives,
but they must decide which they prefer and which they intend to put
forward at the Conference. The question is therefore urgent. For
another reason also. The Anglo-French declaration presumably com
mits us to taking the vote of representatives of the various communities
in the country. Our officers must therefore be preparing the ground
in order to secure the vote we wish, and they must therefore have
instructions. The urgent necessity for this is shown by the Civil
Commissioner’s telegrams 9900 of the 16th and 9920 of the 17th
November 1918, which not only show the confusion into which he and
the pro-British sections of the population have been thrown by the
Anglo-French declaration, but also suggest that if ire do not prepare
the ground, others will (“ local Muhammadan gentry .... are
“ already announcing to Jews and Christians that they will shortly see
“ themselves once more under Muhammadan domination, ’ &c.).
3. It seems not improbable from such evidence as is available that we might get
a British Protectorate, in the sense of Sir P. Cox’s first alternative, accepted in Iraq,
if we worked for it at once. But presumably we have to consider the effect that this
would have on Franco-Arab relations in Syria and the French sphere. A British
Protectorate in Iraq would be interpreted by the French as entitling them to a
protectorate in Syria, if they could get the Arabs to vote for it; and the Arabs would
round on us for betraying them to the French. 1 This is an important consideration,
' The idea that we can get the French out of Syria by an appeal to local option under the Anglo-
French declaration seems to me visionary, unless the League of Nations or some other outside force
imposes this upon them; nor do I see that we have any particular interest in getting the French out
of Syria.
10 S (5 40 11/18