Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎110r] (223/380)

[Crown c
MEMOBANDUM ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF SETTLE
MENT OF WESTERN ASIA.
1. Hejaz. —We have never arrived at any settlement of the question of sphere of
influence here, though M. Picot has more than once assured us that he had obtained
from his Government a settlement in our favour. Wd ought to secure a treaty with
Husein similar to those in force with “ Trucial Chiefs” (but, N.B., we should then be
under obligations to protect Husein against Ibn Saud, as we are already to protect
Ibn Saud against Husein). The Ottoman Bank question, which is intimately related
to the larger question, ought to be solved by direct encouragement to Husein to close
the Jiddah branch, and by the establishment, through Gellatly, Hankey and Co. or
otherwise, of a British or British Indian Bank.
Settlement of the Khurma question would be best deferred as long as possible. If
Feisal makes good in Damascus and Ibn Rashid joins the Sherifs League, Ibn Saud
will have to cave in eventually. On the Gulf, in Iraq, at Damascus, and on the Hejaz
coast we control all his avenues of supply except the long caravan route from Yemen, on
which, through the Imam, we might also exercise a certain influence.
The King of the Hejaz ought never to be allowed more than the most nominal
suzerainty over any other Arab area, since his rule must necessarily be theocratic and
always (however well-intentioned) repressive of Arab Christians. But (l) a vague
general title, such as “ Malik el-Arban ” or “ Malik el-Hashimi,” should be recognized
by us, and we might well encourage by every discreet and unobvious means in our
power the practice of praying for him in the khutua as Emir eva-Numnfiin, not only in
the general Arab area, but also in India.
But in the full recognition of him or anyone else as Caliph we ought to take no
hand whatever, since that title necessarily implies sovereignty over our own subjects
and potential hostility to all Christian Powers. Wb ought in no way to follow the bad
Italian precedent in Tripolitania, where rights of rehgio-legal interference were conceded
to the Ottoman Caliph. We should never, as I think, in any diplomatic document or
in any other way acknowledge the existence of a Caliph, and no hope of conciliating
Indian Moslems ought to modify this rule. The more Caliphs there are actually
recognized by the Moslem world at one time the better for us. At present there are
virtually three, the Ottoman, the Arab and the Moroccan.
2. — Idrisi. —I will only put on record my profound disbelief in Idrisi ever being of
the smallest use to us. He w r ill never become a power in Arabia. But I should not
advise encouragement of the Imam of Sanaa to. encroach on Idrisi’s domain since this is
Sunnite and will never be quiet under Zeidite Government. King Husein ought to
have Kunfida and the Idrisi be left where he is now to make what arrangements with
the Asiri tribes he will. If the tribes of the Yemen Tihama want him as overlord, well
and good, but don’t let him have Hodeida in any event. If he does intrigue with the
Italians, it will matter very little.
3. Imam of Sanaa.—[See remarks on Idrisi.) If the Imam wishes to be our friend,
I should let him have Moeha as his port; but he must abjure all agwession in the
Aden Protectrate and east of it. If the Tihama definitely does not want his rule, make
“ Irucial Chief” treaties with its notables. Zebid is its natural capital. The Italians
will never be able to penetrate any part of Yemen worth having if their Abyssinian and
Tripolitan deeds are any guide.
4. Ihn Saud.—[See remarks on Hejaz.)
5. Syria .—Pending settlements with French, whom no Syrian district, not even
Lebanon and Beirut, will accept willingly (especially if Palestine and the Arab State
are virtually British), the points to insist on provisionally seem to be these :—
[a.) That all inter-Ally agreements lose validity with the opening of the Peace
Conference, if not before.
(6.) That in all oflicial inter-Ally conversations about any part of the Arab area
henceforth, Arabs themselves must participate, as Allies.
(c.) That meanwhile the Arab State must have a sea port, preferably Tripoli, in
order to pay its way. Indirect taxation, through Customs, is its only
reliable source of revenue.
(B18/456) 60 11/18 H&S 6539wo