Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎97v] (198/380)

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substantial modification of them would leave him no option but to withdraw from all
further participation in the Arab movement. In conclusion he expresses the hope that
his fate may be decided by His Majesty’s Government and not deferred for consideration
by a Peace Conference.
As will be seen from a note—marked “ A ” and attached—by the Arab bureau,
the terms now quoted by King Husein are quite unacceptable as they stand. He has,
in fact, merely reiterated the demands in his letters written previous to the revolt, with
several additions to them, and has totally ignored the reservations imposed by His
Majesty’s Government in their replies. His general point of view is substantially a-s
described in the first part of my despatch No. 129 of the 25th June. He is doubtful
of his capacity unaided to realise his aims, and fearful of the censure which he feels
will be meted out to him, as a duped schismatic, by Moslems if he fails. He is oppressed
with affairs of State, accepted at an advanced age and under conditions of exceptional
difficulty. He probably realises that the political Caliphate as conceived by Sultan
Abdul-Hamid must disappear, but he is sufficiently conservative and under the influence
of contemporary opinion to believe that a leader is still essential to the unity of Islam,
and that such a leader must have, at any rate, a facade of Empire behind him.
Although I think it not improbable that Sunnite opinion on this subject will
change, and will incline gradually to what I may term a “ pontific ” conception of the
Caliph—I already see some slight indications of this amongst Moslem “ intellectuals
yet I have little doubt that King Husein’s view is still that of the very large majority
of his co-religionists. I also think that we shall be well advised to recognise actual
Moslem sentiment in this respect, not in order to perpetuate an impracticable and
dangerous conception, but as a means of counteracting Ottoman reactionary intrigue
after the war, and to facilitate the smooth transition of Sunnite opinion from a temporal
to a spiritual conception of the Caliphate.
I have set forth this somewhat theoretic aspect of the matter because 1 regard it as
very pertinent to the proper consideration of our policy at the present juncture.
Moslems in general have hitherto regarded the Hejaz revolt, and our share in it, with
suspicion or dislike. In their eyes its justification is contingent on its success ; failure
would be seriously detrimental to our prestige and to our future relations with them.
I consider that the withdrawal of King Husein from active leadership of the Arab
movement would entail consequences little short of disastrous. It would remove the
only commanding figure and reduce Arab military participation to spasmodic tribal
activity against the Turks. Further disintegration would ensue, leading, in all
probability, to a conflagration in Central Arabia of which our enemies would take full
advantage, and which would seriously affect our military operations. It is, therefore,
highly important to reassure the King, and to rectify his present attitude, which appears
to be due, primarily, to uncertainty of our real intentions and policy regarding him.
The Khurma incident, the disagreement with Emir Feisal (see my telegram 1335), and
the tone of King Husein’s letters, all indicate' that the state of tension is increasing
and, unless relieved at once, will produce a situation from which the King will seek
escape by carrying out his threat of resignation.
In these circumstances I submit that there are only two courses open to us :—
1. To take King Husein into our confidence, as far as we can, and to inform him of
our intentions in regard to him ; or
2. To leave matters as they are and risk the collapse of the Arab movement.
Of these two alternatives I very strongly recommend the former for immediate
adoption.
I am not aware to what extent the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement are still
considered binding ; and consequently, in considering the nature of the assurances we
might give King Husein regarding Syria and the future arrangements in Central and
Southern Arabia, I have not attempted to indicate the points on which previous
reference to the French Government would be required.
In the first place I think it safe to assume that he now realises that any connection
that may exist between his Government and the future Governments in Syria and
Mesopotamia will be no more than nominal, and that his personal relations with the
Moslem populations of these regions will be determined by his success or failure to
establish a predominant position in Arabia. He should, therefore, have no real cause *
* Not printed, since the passages quoted will be found in the memorandum (“ Special,” 3), recently
printed and circulated by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, on British commitments
to King Husein.