Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎95v] (194/380)

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The physical dangers and sufferings of the four princes in the very difficult campaigns of
1916, 1917 and 1918 must be reckoned to their credit. The loyalty to their word and
Allies of the old King and his sons, who have refused from the Turks successive oners
of autonomv in Arabia, independence in Arabia with autonomy in Syria, and of the
Kbalifate, with independence in Arabia and autonomy in all the Arabic provinces, may
be recommended as an example to the Power which persuaded him to revolt, but which
was ready, without his knowledge, to hand him over, with the people for whom he
stood guardian, to the Turks on much worse terms.
The Present Intention of the Arab Governments.
(a.) In Arabia, meaning the peninsula proper, the old man of Mecca intends to be
the unquestioned head. If he has patience, he will become so by slow processes of time
and pilgrimage. As, however, he is foolish, it would be well if one of his sons joined
him soon at Mecca. In Yemen the Sherif has no concrete aims. Ibn Rashid and
Kuweit are already in touch with him. In Nejd, the situation created by the indirect
conflict of India and Egypt over Ibn Sand and the Idrisi presents no real difficulties.
Both men are fortunately heretics in Islam, not much better than the Agha Khan in
orthodox opinion. Idrisi tried to graft elements of African fetishism on the abstract
creeds of Arabia, and is failing. His disappearance is only a question of years. Ibn
Saud is now striving to limit the puritan revival becoming too strong for him. If he is
carried away by it, and attacks the holy places, the orthodox Islam will deal with him,
as with his ancestor. If he can control it he will remain Emir of Nejd after military
failure has warned him to recognize the Sherif as his overlord. I think Ibn Saud is
friendlv to us and that he is the only person so minded in his dominions.
I would like to suggest that the experience of the last four years has shown the
undesirability of allowing Arabia to be controlled by any or by all of the present
authorities in Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus or Simla. We have been provincial, if not
parochial, in view.
(b.) In Syria the Arab movement becomes really important, since its origin was to
prevent the man-pow r er and strategic advantages of that country falling into the hands
of any continental power. For this purpose the Arabs require equal rights with any
other power in the Gulf of Alexandretta, the coast line from there to Tripoli, the port
of Tripoli and its railway to Homs, the Bukaa from Homs to Lake Huleh, access by
treaty to Haifa, and all "the country east of this line and the Jordan. Further, Feisul
requires to be sovereign in his dominions, with complete liberty to choose any foreign
advisers he wants of any nationality he pleases. These advisers will be part of the
Arab Government and will draw their executive authority from it and not from their
own Government. It may be possible to secure Arab recognition of the Turkish Dette
in return for an equitable share of the Bey rout and Haifa Customs receipts. Feisul
will, however, not consider himself bound by any agreement to which he is not a party.
His assets in Syria are not small. He controls most of the good corn land and the
four industrial towns. He has 80 per cent, of the Moslems (including all the fighting
men) on his side, all the Ansariya, all the Jews. He has inherited the old Turkish
Civil Service, all .whose lower ranks, and many of whose upper ranks, are Arab. He
himself is clear-sighted and well educated, and is capable of satisfying the needs of
Syria in local self-government. If he fails the responsibility will lie at the door of the
European Powers, in whose word he shows an undue simplicity of trust.
(c.) In Palestine the Arabs hope that the British will keep what they have
conquered. They will not approve Jewish independence in Palestine, but will support
so far as they can Jewish infiltration, if it is behind a British, as opposed to an
international, fagade. If any attempt is made to set up the international control
proposed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Feisul will press for self-determination in
Palestine, and give the moral support of the Arab Government to the peasantry of
Palestine, to resist expropriation.
(d.) In Irak the Arabs expect the British to keep control. The Sherif, relying on
his agreement with us, hopes for a nominal Arab administration there.
(e.) In Jezireh there are very vivid Arab Nationalists, but they are in an
unsatisfactory geographical position, until a proportion of the nomadic and settled
Kurds can be persuaded to join hands with the local government required there.
1 would suggest that areas d and e should be kept quite separate, at least
administratively. The problems of Irak are those of great public works and of a
highly developed agriculture. The problems of Jezireh are those of turbulent mountain
villagers, and semi-nomadic tribes.