Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎77r] (157/380)

T
T
13. iv
W A E C A B I NET
S E C E E T
EASTERN C0L2.-ITTEE,
E.C.-1918.
EGYPT
Decypher. General Clayton (Cairo)
October 13th
D m 11.SO a.m. October ISth, 1918.
E. 12 1 2C p.m. October ISth, 1918
No. 115
Political situation as between French and Arabs is as follows
Arabs have never been officially informed of terms of Anglo-
French agreement but have a good idea of its provisions ov..ing to
Bolshevik indiscretions and publication by Jemal Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , This has
increased their distrust of French intentions in regard to Syria.
They have therefore taken every advantage of the assurances given
to the Arab leaders in Foreign Office telegram 753 of June 16th
and have nominated Governors to take over control of towns in the
coastal area immediately on their evacuation by the Turks. This
was the case at Beyrout where an Arab Governor .Shukri pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. El
Ayubi was found installed on the arrival of our troopso The
Commandor-in-Chief appointed Colonel de Piepapc as Hilitary Govern
or but difficulty was caused by Shukri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. who refused to give up
his post v/ithout definite instructions from Feisal. The matter has
been arranged locally and Colonel do Piepapc has been installed
but the main principle has not been settled as Fcisal states that
he cannot officially recall Ehukri without such loss of prestige
as might necessitate his resignation, except on the following
conditions
(1) He wishes to have a personal assurance from the Commander-
in-Chief that whatever arrangements may now be made for districts
in the coastal area aro of a military nature and without prejudice
to the eventual settlement >hich will bo decided (? eventually) by
the enemy r s position at the Peace Conference.
(2) That the Commander-in-Chief 1 s assurance be confirmed in due
course by both British and French Governments, Feisal T s attitude
towards us is one of complete confidence but he is very suspicious
of French intentions. I consider it essential that a definite
announcement of French policy of a nature to allay these suspicions
be made as soon as possible, otherwise we shall have the same
difficulties all up the coast as we have had already at 3 eyrout f
Tyre and Sidon. Another serious difficulty, as I have already
observed, is the absence of any French official of high standing
with wide powers. Problems arise daily in the "A” area on which
the Arabs require immediate advice and assistance. We are standing
aside in accordance with our agreements 'with Franco, but there are
no Frenchmen '? permitted) or empowered to act. If the present
unsatisfactory situation continues in which wo have to hold the
balance between French and Arabs, it must end in our being accused
of bad faith by both. It is no use the French reiterating their
claims unless they take the problem in hand seriously and produce
the advice and material assistance which alone can conciliate the
considerable body of Arab opinion which at the present moment is
opposed to their Syrian policy. It is of interest to note the
opinion of our political officer in Boyrout which^is regarded as
the centre of French influence. He reports that it is dilfieuxt
to gauge public opinion accurately but he estimates that 75% of the
population dosire autonomy under British guidance, 10% hold similar
views out wish for French guidance, while 15% would prefer a
Sherifian form of Government.