Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎6v] (14/380)

centre at Damascus, and which in the summer of 1915 (when the military strength
the Turks was concentrated at the Dardanelles, at the opposite extremity of the Empire)^^
were a more effective political factor than at any time before or since.
From Faroki’s statement, 23 we know that the Damascus Committee had given their
allegiance to Sherif Husein before he opened negotiations with bir H. McMahon, and
that the terms he put forward (particularly on the question of boundaries) were largely
suggested by them. He virtually declared this in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon,
on the 1st January, 1916 :—
“Your Honour will have realised after the arrival of Mohammed (faioki)^
Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of
no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but
that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that
we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position
they (our people) have pressed upon us.
“ These truths are in my opinion very important and deserve \our Honours
special attention and consideration ” (p. 111).
This explains the large pretensions (otherwise difficult to understand) with which
the Sherif started and which he has never given up. But before the Sherif s revolt in
the Hejaz came to a head, the movement in Syria, from which his initiative had come,
was crushed by the Turks. From Faroki’s statement it appears that the military branch
was broken up about August 1915, while the civilian leaders were mostly hanged or
deported in February 1916. 2+ In his fifth letter to Sir H. McMahon of the 18th
February, 1916, the Sherif mentioned that the Syrian movement had practically been
stamped out (p. 6, Part II), and in another letter, dated the 29th March, 1916, he
stated that the Syrians were now incapable of action. 20 His Majesty’s Government on
their part discouraged the Sherif from a forward policy in Syria on the eve of his revolt,
both on military grounds and for fear of political complications with France. 2(1
Thus, during the period between the beginning of the negotiations in July 1915,
and the outbreak of the revolt in the Hejaz in June 1916, the relative importance of
the Syrian movement dwindled while that of the Sherif increased ; and when the
question was raised of sending Faroki and al Masri, as representatives of the movement,
to Basra to get into touch with the Arabs in the Turkish Army on that front, His
Majesty’s Government referred to the Sherif s claim to represent the Arab nation, and
laid down their policy as follows :—
“ While there is no clear evidence as to how far this claim accords with facts,
it has not been questioned by His Majesty s Government. If the claim be well
founded, it is a matter for consideration whether independent assurances should be
given to other and ex-hypothesi less responsible Arabs.’
When, therefore, the Sherif threw off his allegiance to Turkey, he found his
effective sovereignty confined to the Hejaz, as Amir of which he was merely one among
a number of independent Arab rulers, who divided between them the allegiance of the
tribes and oases of the Arabian Peninsula. The Arabs ot Syria and Jezireh, whose
allegiance had promised to make him the indisputable leader of the National Movement
in the (Asiatic) Arab countries, were still under the heel of the Turk, with no immediate
prospect of liberation. But the title to leadership which they had enabled him to
assume had been continued by the relations into which he had meanwhile entered with
His Majesty’s Government ; and this, together with his prestige as hereditary guardian
of the Holy Cities, made it difficult for him to accept bin Sand, the Imam, the Idrisi,
etc., who were his equals in fact, as his peers in honorary rank.
These facts explain the problems that have arisen over his title and his relations
with the other independent Arab Chiefs.
On the 5th August, 1916, in a telegram of thanks to His Majesty the King for his
congratulations on the success of the Hejaz revolt, Husein signed himself, entirely
correctly, as “ Sherif and Amir of Mecca,” 28 and the same signature appeared under a
proclamation he issued next month to the people of Irak. 20
23 157740/15; cp. 152729/15: Telegram of the 10th October, 1915, from General Maxwell to Lord
Kitchener. 24 The Turkish account of the Arab movement is given in •* YeriuS sur la question
Syrienne ” (Sfa eoul: 1910 , issued by the Fourth Turkish Army Command). 25 71430/16. 26 76013/16;
*1915/10 : 95496/16; 107964/16. 27 54229/16 : Foreign (Mice telegram No. 262 of the 5th April, 1916, to
Sir 11. McMahon. 28 1 53580/16. 20 205733/16.