Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎1r] (3/380)

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B
jThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty t Government.]
secret.
/A
, Political Intelligence Department,
Foreign Office.
Special 3.
MEMORANDUM
ON
BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO KING HUSEIN.
OUR commitments to King Husein are not embodied in any agreement or treaty
signed, or even acknowledged, by both parties. In this way they differ from those to
Russia, France, Italy, and certain independent Arab rulers such as the Idrisi and
bin Sand. They can only be analysed by summarising the history of our dealings with
the King during the war, under different he ids. And the position is complicated by
the King’s habit of ignoring or refusing to take note of conditions laid down by us to
which he objects, and then carrying on as if the particular question had been settled
between us according to his own desires.
The references in the following summary, where not to Foreign Office papers, are
to the historical narrative compiled by the Arab Bureau at Cairo and dated the
29th November, 1916. The pagination referred to is that of the Foreign Office copy
(filed in the Librarv under “ Confidential : Turkey : Arab Bureau: 1914 seqq.
(No. 112) ”).
(i.) General Guarantees against the Restoration of the status quo.
His Majesty’s Government’s representatives in Egypt had been in touch with
Sherif Husein and his sons—especially Abdullah—before the war.
On the 24th September 1914 (in the interval during which Great Britain was at
* war with Germany but not yet with Turkey) the Foreign Office telegraphed at Lord
Kitchener’s request to Cairo, instructing that a special messenger should be sent to
Abdullah to enquire what would be the Sherif’s attitude in the event of war with
Turkey breaking out (p. 21a). Abdullah sent a written answer expressing his
preference for Great Britain over Turkey,—
“ So long as she protects the rights of our country and the rights of the person
of His Highness our present Emir and Lord and the rights of his Emirate and its
independence in all respects, without any exceptions or restrictions, and so long as
it supports us against any foreign aggression and in particular against the Ottomans,
especially if they wish to set up any one else as Emir with the intention of causing
irircrnal dissension—their principle of government—and prov ided that the Govern
ment of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and
in writing. This guarantee we expect to receive at the first opportunity ” (p. 23).
This request was met in a Foreign Office telegram of the 3lst October 1914 (the
date on which war between Great Britain and Turkey was declared) :—
“Lord Kitchener’s salaams to Sherif Abdullah If the Arab nation
assist England in this war that has been forced upon us by Turkey, England will
guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs
every assistance against external aggression'
“ It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or
Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now
occurring ” (p. 24).
This statement was transmitted to Abdullah by letter from Cairo with the following
addition :—
“ If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in this conflict, Great
Britain is willing, recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the
Emir Husein (titles), to guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the
Sherifiate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans.
Till now we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall
be in that of the noble Arabs ” (p. 24).