File 87/1926 Pt 2 'Arabia: Bin Saud: Relations with H.M.G. Revision of Treaty.' [‎541r] (769/840)

Memorandum on the Eastern Frontier of Trans-Jordan.
The object of the present memorandum is to sei forth, for the
information of Sir Gilbert Clayton, the conclusions which I have been
able to draw from my investigations concerning the eastern frontier
of Trans-Jordan. I paid two visits to Trans-Jordan, during one of
which I went as far as Ma‘an and the Jafr region to the east of it.
Besides the conversations I had with the Amir ‘Abdullah, the Chief
^British Representative, Rikabi Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and Lt.-Col. Peake at ‘Amman,
I held meetings with eleven of the principal Beduin chiefs, whose
names and tribes are stated in Annexure A.
Two Points at Issue.
2. The letter of instructions issued to Sir Gilbert Clayton by the
Secretary of State states, in paragraph 3, that the line of frontier
proposed at the Kuweit Conference is no longer adhered to; and
directs that Sir Gilbert Clayton should use his utmost endeavours to
secure the inclusion of Kaf within I rans-Jordan territory. Lower
down, in paragraph 5, reference is made to Ibn Sa'ud’s reported
desire to include in Nejd the territory to the west of the W adi Sirhan
comprising the four Wadis—Bayir, Gharra, Hasa and Hidrij ; but
the question of how to deal with this claim of Ibn Sa'ud’s is left to
the discretion of Sir Gilbert Clayton, who is to act in the light of
information to be supplied to him by the High Commissioner for
Palestine. These are the only two points which remain unsettled.
The others, which deal with the northern frontier of Xejd, the
southern frontier of Trans-Jordan and the southern sector of the
eastern frontier of Trans-Jordan, are all definitely settled and do not
admit of discussion. I will therefore confine myself to the two points
stated above.
Proposed Line.
3. The results of my investigations go to show that it is imperative
that the line proposed at the Kuweit Conference be moved eastwards
in such a way as to coincide as nearly as possible with meridian 38.
This would mean that not only Kaf and the four Wadis, but also
the northern half of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan, would be included within
Trans-Jordan territory, as far as a point roughly midway between
Waiset and Nabk. There are weighty reasons for this, as I propose
to show in the following paragraphs.
Reasons tor the Line.
Strategic.
4. First come the strategic reasons. The fortress adjoining the
village of Kaf forms an excellent and valuable observation-post for
raids coming up the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan towards ‘Amman. It is a strong
fortress and does not require a large garrison. If it were to be
provided with a suitable force and fitted with wireless communication,
it would be of indispensible value. The Trans-Jordan authorities
state that if such had been the case at the time of the W ahabi raid
in the autumn of 1924, the approach of the raiders could have been
reported to ‘Amman several hours earlier than it was. The import
ance of Kaf from the strategic point of view is also emphasized by
the R.A.F. authorities.