File 87/1926 Pt 2 'Arabia: Bin Saud: Relations with H.M.G. Revision of Treaty.' [‎530v] (748/840)

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Ibn Sa‘ud said he welcomed the suggestion. It was not obstinacy
on his part; he was simply anxious to arrive at some settlement
which would lead to peace. He would like to point out, however
that the door mig-ht be left open for ‘Iraq tribes to seek shelter with
him and that tribes seeking refuge might not always be from Nejd.
As he had said before, he knew his own tribes and was sure of
them, but there were a few individuals who might cause trouble and
harm, and that was the reason he pressed the principle which he
thought should form the basis of any agreement. At the same time, .
he welcomed my suggestion of preparing a draft agreement.
I replied that although the draft agreement might not, and indeed *
would not, embody the principle to which His Highness attached so
much importance, it would not be contrary to the interests which he
had at heart. I begged him to reconsider an attitude which could
only prejudice the chances of a satisfactory agreement on all points,
and which I was bound to tell him was, in my opinion, exceedingly
unreasonable.
Ibn Sa‘ud hoped that his arguments would not be taken as evi
dence of obstinacy on his part. He had put forward the principle
which we had discussed because he was convinced that any agree
ment which did not embody it would be unsuccessful in preventing
mischief, and he thought it his duty to point this out to His Majesty’s
Government. He did not think that conditions in other countries
applied to Arab countries. Under the proposed agreement if an
Arab were to kill or transgress in some way, how were they to lay
hands on him? Nevertheless, he approved the suggestion of a draft
agreement, but he would ask that his view be embodied in the
preamble of such agreement.
I said I would, that afternoon or the next morning, prepare an
informal draft which I would have translated into Arabic for the
benefit of His Highness. In the present circumstances this appeared
to be the only way in which we could progress. Ibn Sa‘ud said
that the advantage of discussing everything was that it helped to
make the position clear. I agreed, and added that His Majesty’s
Government were most anxious that an agreement should be con-
clucled which they were convinced w r ould, given cordial co-operation
on both sides, tend to improve matters, not rapidly perhaps, but at
least slowly and surely.
The meeting adjourned at 12 noon.
That afternoon Ibn Sa‘ud went to Mecca on the understanding
t at he would spend there the whole of Friday and return to the
camp early on Saturday. At midday on the Saturday, however, a
message came from him to the effect that important affairs of State
required his presence in Mecca until Sunday evening, but that, if I
pressed it, he would be prepared to return to the camp on Saturday
rug it. icplied asking His Highness to suit his convenience, and
m j C m ^ ( rv ? I arranged for the draft agreement to be completed
and communicated to the Sultan’s advisers so that they might
examine it against his return. Ibn Sa’ud eventually returned at
sunse on unday and I had an informal interview with him that
ni £f ' e negotiations were resumed on the following morning.