File 87/1926 Pt 2 'Arabia: Bin Saud: Relations with H.M.G. Revision of Treaty.' [‎525r] (737/840)

Government fixed this last point as that at which the eastern frontier
of Trans-Jordan should end, and that they could not consent to any
encroachment beyond the line which they had already proposed in
regard to the southern portion of that section of the frontier.
With regard to the northern frontier of Nejd I reminded Ibn Sa‘ud
that the frontier between ‘Iraq and Nejd, as laid down in Protocol
Number 2 to the Muhammara Convention, ended at the intersection
of meridian 39° E. with parallel 32° N., and informed him that His
Sfajesty’s Government must insist that the frontier between Nejd
and Trans-Jordan should take off from that point and also could
not permit it to follow any line which carried it to the north of
parallel 32° N.
Ibn Sa'ud took strong- exception to the last statement, maintaining
that free access between Nejd and Syria was vital, and that he
viewed with grave apprehension the existence astride those communi
cations of a strip of territory under the control of ‘Iraq and Trans
jordan. In reply I regretted that my instructions left me no discre
tion on this point.
Second Meeting.
The second meeting took place at 9 a.m. on Monday, the 12th
October, with the same attendance as before.
Ibn Sa‘ud maintained that the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan had always been part
of his dominions and Kaf had been in the possession of his grand
father. It was only at the instance of Sir Percy Cox that he had
refrained from occupying it. I suggested that any legitimate rights
might perhaps be safeguarded by some sort of saving clause in the
Agreement, but Ibn Sa‘ud said he could not see what guarantees
would be of any value if he had to give it up, though he, on his side,
was prepared to give such undertakings as might be considered
necessary. I suggested that possibly Ibn Sa‘ud did not so much
wish to occupy Kaf as to have the principle established that it lay
within his dominion, but he replied definitely that he wished to
occupy the place and that the mere recognition of his rights to Kaf
would be of no use if occupation were denied to him.
I then pointed out that the establishment by him of a strong force
in military occupation of a strategic point like Kaf must be viewed
with grave uneasiness by the^ Government of Trans-Jordan and re
garded by His Majesty’s Government as a menace to territory under
their Mandate. If one party is holding an important strategic
position, that party is either on the defensive or is definitely menac
ing his neighbour and an occupation by him of such a nature could
only be regarded as military rather than political or administrative.
What I would like to ascertain was the real motive of His Highness
in wishing to occupy Kaf; was it merely because he wished to have
the place included within his territory, and in that case was he pre
pared to leave it open for all purposes; or was it his intention to
establish there a strong military post, tfie reason for which could
only be either that he contemplated offensive action or that he was
himself afraid of being attacked.
Ibn SaTid admitted that his motive in wishing to occupy Kaf had
been to convert it into a stronghold, but if his occupation was likely
to be regarded as a menace he would be prepared to take su^h