File 87/1926 Pt 2 'Arabia: Bin Saud: Relations with H.M.G. Revision of Treaty.' [‎252r] (191/840)

returned to the charge, which they had not yet done;
hut, as it might be desirable at some future date to
concert with other capitulatory powers in order to
obtain the revival of the capitulations, it was important
that notiiing should be put in the treaty, which could be
held to debar us from doing so. i.jwr ^QUBIT. expressed
the view that Article 6, in its present fora, was likely
in any case to secure so little bereiit to lii» majesty's
Government that it was not worth woile insisting upon
it at the risk of a. breakdown of negotiations. It
represented a fraction only of our theoretical rights
under the capitulations, and by accepting this fraction
we might possibly be held to have abandoned the remainder
of our rights. In his opinion the really important
t.dng was to conclude a treaty with ibr oaua, and what
was put in and weat left out of that treaty was of less
importance. /e should concentrate upon finding as many
points as possible, upon which Ibn daud and ourselves
were in agreement, for incorporation in the treaty, and
not upon extracting from an unwilling ibn 3aud the maximum
number of benefits and privileges for ourselves.
Disputed questions could be settled at a later date,
(as was done in the case of Iraq), when our relations
with Ibn 3and had been placed upon a treaty basis.
1* recommended, therefore, that .Article 6 should be
omitted in its entirety, and, if there was any risk of
this being interpreted as an abandonment of our claim to
caoitulatory rights, it could be made clear in the treaty
that the omission of all reference to this question should
not be held to imply that the liberty of either party in
thi s