Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt [‎184r] (367/520)

decided to open his overt campaign by holding a large meeting on the 23rd December.
The supporters of the parties of law and order were wavering, and Sarwat Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. ,
feeling that he might iind himself without the backing in the country which he had
anticipated, became reluctant to assume office. The situation had become dangerous,
and every day seemed to be bringing us nearer to the moment when the machinery of
government would come to a standstill, and we should have all classes of Egyptians
united against us. both in passive and in active hostility.
27. With these considerations before me, 1 decided to silence and to reduce to
impotence Saad Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. Zaghlul and the other leaders of the party which carried
hostility to our claims and influence to the point of reckless indifference to public
order; in short, the revolutionary party.
28. This measure was successful. After two or three weeks of suspense, it
became apparent that I had rightly gauged the main current of Egyptian sentiment,
which, while abandoning in no respect its ideal of independence, desired to pursue
that object with a reasonable regard for law and order.
29. It would not appear from recent despatches that His Majesty’s Government
has adequately appreciated the importance, the bearing, or the effects of these events
But in point of fact they changed the political situation. All those leaders of public
opinion who are aware that a policy of intemperate hostility to Great Britain could
only lead to consequences disastrous to Egypt, and that the best hopes for the
political future of the country depend upon the maintenance of the Council of
Ministers and the revival of representative institutions, gave unmistakable signs of
their readiness to seek for a modus vivendi under which England and Egypt, without
either the one or the other abandoning their views or interests, would be able to
continue to collaborate, pending the arrival of a time when a final agreement might
be possible. The impasse which had confronted us no longer existed; a door had
been opened. But that door must be kept open by appropriate measures. And these
measures involved a change in the attitude and reservations of His Majesty's
Government corresponding to the change in the situation.
30. It'appears to be suggested that I have not kept His Majesty’s Government
sufficiently advised of the steps by which the political situation has been transformed.
This cannot be admitted. The critical character of the proceedings against Zaghlul
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. was obvious. The likelihood that it would produce widespread disorder was
notorious. It was known to His Majesty's Government that that consequence did
not follow. This was a most outstanding and remarkable fact. Comment was not
necessary. As soon as the situation which was obviously in process of crystallising,
if properly handled, as it was, had in fact crystallised, and specific proposals for a
reorientation of our policy had been framed, they were immediately communicated to
His Majesty’s Government in my telegrams Nos. 17-20.
31. At this moment, transient as it seemed likely to be, I presented His Majesty's
Government with an opportunity of laying the foundations for a settlement of the
Egyptian question. I requested a quick decision ; and my request that His Majesty's
Government should seize the right moment for action is now qualified as an
ultimatum.
32. I again pointed to the abolition of the protectorate as the preliminary
condition of the attainment of the aims of His Majesty’s Government. I did so, in
a sense, suddenly ; for though up to a month before, and for eight months previously
I had repeatedly urged this course of action, I had indeed for a month left your
Lordship in the belief that a Ministry would take office otherwise. But during that
month I had been engaged in preparing from the fluid elements of wavering opinion
and fluctuating passion a momentarily stable situation. Had its equilibrium been
sustained by the force of the proposed concession, not only would a Ministry have
taken office, but they would have done so upon terms auguring most favourably for
the settlement of outstanding differences by the method of negotiation which His
Majesty’s Government still maintained their desire to employ. I confess that the
elements were not so manageable as to render it possible for me to present my plan
gradually; nor would an incomplete and tentative plan have merited sufficiently
the consideration of His Majesty’s Government.
33. As to the contention of your telegram No. 32 that my plan involves the
absence of any guarantee for the future position of Great Britain in Egypt, the
question whether it involves the absence of an adequate guarantee is indeed the
main question at issue; and my recent telegrams have been largely devoted to an
attempt to show that it does not. On the one hand the protectorate (genuinely
believed in Egypt to have been intended as a purely war measure) has undoubtedly
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