Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt [‎182v] (364/520)

in the form of an ultimatum, a departure from this policy so grave as to imply the
abandonment of almost the entire position which they had taken up ; presumably
partly as a result of some violent and unexplained change in Egyptian sentiment.
(b.) That although His Majesty's Government, in view of this advice, have
shown their willingness to go to the utmost limit of concession, I have refused to
support their liberal proposals in Egypt.
9. (a.) I am fully aware that the aim of British policy in Egypt has been, and
is, to combine, under conditions of lasting alliance and amity, the realisation of the
legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people with the safeguarding of imperial
communications, the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the defence of the
country against foreign aggression or interference; with this aim I have always
been, and remain, in complete accord.
10. The method chosen by His Majesty’s Government for the attainment of
these aims has been to conduct with representatives of Egypt negotiations by which
it was hoped, in return for certain concessions, notably the abolition of the
protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign State, to obtain the signed
agreement of the Egyptian representatives, and the ratification of a Constituent
Assembly, to certain British rights regarded as essential for the securing of the
Imperial and foreign interests enumerated above, and notably to the right of
maintaining troops in Egypt, whether in certain specified places as some have thought
sufficient, or for a certain specified time, as others have preferred, or in unspecified
places and for an unspecified time, as was finally demanded by His Majesty’s
Government in the draft convention proposed to and rejected by the Egyptian official
delegation last November.
11. While, naturally, I had not attempted to dissuade His Majesty’s Govern
ment either before or during the negotiations from pursuing this most proper method
of reaching a solution of the Egyptian question, I had not disguised from them my
opinion that it would be a matter of extreme difficulty to pursue it to ultimate success.
Though the proposals of the Milner Mission were on their first announcement
regarded as surprisingly liberal, Egyptian opinion soon began to harden against
them, and in any case, when its report was officially published, it was generally
considered that His Majesty’s Government were committed to the policy recommended
therein. His Majesty’s Government might therefore expect to meet probably
insuperable obstacles if they desired to negotiate a treaty in terms more restrictive
than those general terms wdiich had received the approval of the mission. In
particular, as I more than once had occasion to warn your Lordship, no responsible
Egyptian could be expected to sign, or to obtain the ratification of, any provision
giving His Majesty's Government unlimited rights to maintain troops in Egypt.
He would have been recognising in a binding form a claim which Egypt had "not
previously admitted, against which Egyptians had always and increasingly
protested, and which His Majesty’s Government at intervals for the last forty years
had declared not to be a permanent claim.
12. Such being my views, I had not failed to draw your Lordship’s attention
to the necessity of preparing a policy, as liberal as possible, for declaration and
application, by way, at any rate, of a modus vivendi, in the probable event of the
negotiations with the Egyptian Official Delegation breaking down and its being
impossible to conclude a treaty. I did so more particularly in my despatches
No. 311 of the 16th April, 1921, and No. 530 of the 17th June, 1921, in the former
of which I specifically contemplated the unconditional abolition of the protectorate,
while in the latter I put forward the view—which, when again put forward to your
Lordship a few days ago, appears to have amazed His Majesty’s Government and
led them to infer a “violent metamorphosis” in Egyptian opinion that no
Egyptian could “ become a party to a permanent arrangement between Great Britain
and Egypt, which fell short of securing complete independence for the latter, with
any prospect of securing the approval of his countrymen.” If 1 may select for
repetition a sentence from the former despatch, I would remind you that I wrote :
“ The main requirement is that His Majesty’s Government should be prepared for
eventualities and be ready with an alternative policy which could be announced
without further delay if present plans miscarry.”
13. I do not know how far these representations may have been considered at
the time, but, so far as I am aware, when the negotiations with the official delegation
approached the breaking-point, no alternative policy had been prepared.