File of printed papers marked 'Egyptian negotiation' between Curzon and Adly Pasha and the Egyptian delegation [‎65r] (129/178)

[This Document is the Proper t y of His Britann ic Majesty’s Government.]
CONFIDENTIAL. /
/ '
EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.
[E 9723/260/16]
Minute by Mr. Lindsay.
Lord Curzon,
I HAD two and a quarter hours’ talk with Adly this morning.
The greater part of it was on minor points—the Suez Canal, compensation of
British officials, religious toleration.
Over the Suez Canal, 1 do not think that Adly had realised before what the
position was and how the lapse of time simply must compel Egypt to face the problem
of a new arrangement with the company, lie had some criticism to make on the
formula* we had sent to him—that to some extent it removed the decision from the
competence of the Egyptian Government. He had not realised that the last sentence
contained something like a veiled threat to the company. He realised the reasonable
ness of what His Majesty’s Government desired ; though he could agree in principle,
he wanted the question studied by his delegation, and he would prefer really not to
have it in a treaty at all.
Compensation .—We are sending him papers on which he will be able to form an
idea as to the nature of the scheme.
Religious Toleration .—He said the formula proposed in Lord Milner’s memorandum
had roused some criticism in El Azhar, but he did not think there would be difficulty
in introducing some clause, preferably modelled on something from one of the European
minorities treaties.
Act of Indemnity .—He was anxious to pass an Act of Indemnity before the treaty
came into force, and, of course, we had no objection to that. The discussion was
mainly on the practical difficulties. We are writing to Cairo about it.
Over the Financial Adviser, he appeared to-day even more contented with our
formulaf than he was last week. He put in a new suggestion himself (annexed (A)),
consisting in adding the negative stipulation that the official’s advice shall have no
binding effect on the Egyptian Government, but he did not press it. He did not to-day
demur at all to the official having access to the Minister. As to the last part of our
formula, he was torn in his mind whether he would sooner have it maintained or
omitted, as he saw for himself both advantages and disadvantages to either course.
As before, it is still over the succession to the Judicial Adviser that he found most
difficulty. He has the greatest reluctance to agreeing to any stipulated foreign control
in the Ministry of the Interior such as is provided in the secondj part of our proposal.
We discussed this for a long time without, making much progress. Proposals, some
foolish and some merely unacceptable, were put forward by each side, and the most
promising was that, instead of an Inspector-General over the three Commandants of
Police, we should have a “bureau” under the Minister. Even if this idea can be
developed into something useful, we shall have to lace the further difficulty of a
definition of its functions. Are they to be extended to the whole country, or limited to
the three towns ?
1 should mention that two or three times Adly has suggested that a time limit to
various of the treaty stipulations, at the expiration of which revision would be provided
for, would facilitate matters—as is suggested in the military formula. This we have
not taken up.
The three formulae referred to above (Financial,§ Judicial/ and Suez Canal*) are
attached.
R. C. L.
Foreign Office, August 23, 1921.
* See Egyptian Negotiations
t Ditto
+ Ditto
§ Ditto
Ditto
E 9677/176/16 (enclosure)].
E 9590/260/16 (IF
- Ditto (2j
Ditto
Ditto
(1) J
(2)
421—8 [0864 a]