File of printed papers marked 'Egyptian negotiation' between Curzon and Adly Pasha and the Egyptian delegation [‎48r] (95/178)

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proffer his advice unasked, but he would ensure that the financial administration was
exposed to the healthy sunlight of publicity both in Europe and Egypt. It is thought
that such an arrangement would not be unpalatable to the Egyptians, who maintain
that they have nothing to hide, and that the Egyptian Government might be induced
to provide the officials salary and expenses.
18. It is therefore suggested that, subject to the acceptance by Egypt of the
obligations mentioned in paragraph 15 above, we could safely confine our financial
control to securing that full publicity was given to all details of financial adminis
tration.
19. Turning to the question of judicial control, it has been explained in
paragraph 14 that any reorganisation oi the Mixed Courts as at present constituted
cannot take place for some years, and in a previous minute (of the 82nd July in
E. 853?) it was pointed out that it was undesirable to impose a scheme of judicial
reform which no one really wants. This being the case and assuming the continuation
of the regime of the Capitulations, what other safeguards are essential for the
protection of foreigners ?
20. In the first place, the standard of the present Mixed Courts must not be
lowered, and to secure this it is suggested that the delegation might be induced to
agree that the nomination of foreign judges and of the “ Procureur general” should
be effected in close consultation with the High Commissioner.
21. It is also necessary to protect foreigners against abuses of administrative
authority. The Capitulations alone are not an adequate safeguard, as an ill-disposed
administrative official could make a foreigner’s life a burden by the arrest of the
latter’s native assistants or servants. Recourse to the Courts is, of course, always
open, but it is an inadequate safeguard. It. is suggested, on the analogy of
paragraph Hi, that the Egyptians might be induced to accept a provision whereby the
High Commissioner would be entitled to send an officer to examine into any case
where a foreigner had reason to complain of an abuse of power on the part of the
local authorities. Such an arrangement would not constitute any interference with
the internal administration of the country, but it would prevent clandestine oppression
by means of decent publicity. It is thought that the Egyptian Government might be
induced to defray the salary and expenses of such an official as being but a small
price to pay for their freedom from control in matters of internal administration.
22. To sum up, we can afford to be generous on all points, and to go even further
than Lord Milner except in the matter of British troops, their use and disposition.
The vital points on which we must insist are all matters where foreign interests in
general and not merely British interests are involved.
23. It is suggested, therefore, that the delegation might be told that their
arguments have impressed us, and that we are prepared to meet their wishes in many
respects provided that they on their side will accept the fundamental principle that
British troops are in Egypt to protect foreigners, as to which principle there can be no
compromise.
21 If, on this basis, the negotiations cannot profitably be continued, there
remains the last card, namely, that the delegation should accept the principle
enunciated in the preceding paragraph as an interim measure for a term of years. In
this case it is suggested that the whole treaty should be for a term of years, and
consequently, as a natural corollary, that the protectorate should not be abolished but
suspended for such period as tho treaty may remain in force.
July 27, 1921.
J. M.