File of printed papers marked 'Egyptian negotiation' between Curzon and Adly Pasha and the Egyptian delegation [‎12v] (24/178)

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to be not nearer to, but distinctly further from, the goal at which Great Britain had
professed to be aiming. With our continued insistence on the Protectorate, wmcn
they all regarded as implying the permanent subjection ol their country, uiea
Britain had definitely departed from her original policy, and, m tact, bioken er
word. They had accepted the Protectorate, when it w r as first declared, as a necessi y
of the moment. Great Britain, being at war with Turkey, had not unreasonab y
severed the remaining links between Turkey and Egypt, and something had immedi
ately to be substituted for the former Turkish suzerainty. Ihe Protectorate was thus
justified as a temporary expedient, but at the end of the war they had alw ays expected
that Great Britain w T ould proceed to regulate her relations with Egypt in a manner
more consistent with her declarations, with her real interests, and with her honour.
Instead of that, they now saw nothing be tore them but the permanent loss ot their
nationality, of their existence as a people. They were to become a British Colony,
to be British subjects. Against that they appealed, and would continue to appeal,
to the British sense of justice and in the last resort to the sympathy of the w r hole
civilised world.
(C .)—Future Policy.
Such, we believe, is a fair statesment of the average opinion of Egyptian
Nationalists. The violence, unfairness and unreason of the more extreme and noisy
section have given to the whole movement an appearance of intransigeance which, in
our opinion, is not essential or necessarily enduring. The remarkable organisation
known as the Wafd (‘ ; Delegation ’) which, under the leadership of Zaghlnl
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , has established, for the time being at least, so complete an ascendancy over the
Egyptian public, and claims, not without many credentials, to speak in the name of
“the nation,” does not consist mainly of extreme men. Its members were drawn
largely from the ranks of the old Hisb el Umma, which, in contrast to the Hisb
el Watani, the real revolutionary and anti-British party, stood for gradual and
constitutional progress. It is true that in face of an attitude on our part which
seemed to them to present a blank negative to all their hopes, Zaghlul and his
associates have, until quite recently, been drifting steadily to the left. But in our
experience, it only needed some effort to understand their point of view and to remove
their suspicions of the intentions of Great Britain, in order to get many of the
Zaghlulists to discuss the situation in a perfectly reasonable spirit. And the same
is naturally true of men of even more moderate views, like the ex-Ministers Rushdi,
Adli and Sarwat Pashas, who, while sympathising with the ideals of Nationalism,
had never actually joined the Wafd. In such discussions, when once we had got
aw r ay from phrases and formulae and come to grips with the practical difficulties of
the problem, it soon became apparent that there were many shades and varieties of
opinion among Egyptians. The one thing common to them all was the desire to
preserve their nationality, their distinctive character as a people.
It is evident from what has been said that any effort at reconciliation between
British and Egyptians, any policy which seriously attempts to bring the more
moderate and friendly elements of Egyptian Nationalism once more on to our side,
must take account of this deeply-rooted feeling. No grant to Egypt of a greater or
less measure of “ self-government,” even if it went the length of what is known as
“ Dominion Home Rule,” would meet the case, because Egyptians do not regard their
country as a British Dominion or themselves as British subjects. This wholly
differentiates the problem of constitutional development in Egypt from the same
problem in countries which have for years indubitably formed part of the British
Empire, as, for instance, British India. We talk of such countries gradually attaining
the status of nationhood. The Egyptians claim that they already have this status.
No settlement of the future of Egypt which does not recognise this claim is ever
likely to be accepted by—it can only be imposed on—the Egyptian people.
As against these considerations, we have the patent fact that Egypt, though not
actually a part of the British Empire, is of vital importance to our whole Imperial
system, and that that country under British guidance has attained a new level of
civilisation, from which it w T ould be disastrous to allow it to relapse. To reconcile
the defence of these interests—Egyptian as well as British—with the recognition of
the national status of Egypt is no easy matter. And the problem seems, at first sight,
to be further complicated, though on a closer study it may turn out to be really
simplified, by the exceptionally strong position which the foreign Colonies, otheV
than the British, occupy in Egypt. In no other Eastern country are there so many
resident Europeans, enjoying such special privileges or filling so many important
posts in commerce, in education, in the professions, in society and even in the Govern-