Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎172r] (343/348)

i This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
GERMANY.
[October 3.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[C 17141/313/18] No. 1 .
I he Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe {Paris).
fNo. 3174.)
My Lor<L Foreign Office, October 3, 1923.
I DE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon on a visit, as he
described it, of courtesy. He went on to say that there were two subjects on which he
desired to say a word.
The first was the action to be taken by the Allied Governments with regard to
appointing Ambassadors at the future Turkish capital. This was a question which I
had raised a little while ago, when I had asked the French, assuming that all the
Great Powers would have Ambassadors, what we should do if the Turkish Govern
ment ignored Constantinople, made, as they were believed likely to make, Angora
their capital, and asked that the Ambassadors, if appointed, should go there.
I had pointed out that the total absence of convenience, and indeed the almost
savage barbarity of Angora, rendered it out of the question that foreign repre
sentatives of high rank should go to a place where there were not even residences in
which they could dwell; and I had raised the question whether, in the circumstances,
we should send Ambassadors to Constantinople, declining to allow them to go to
Angora, or only have some representative of lower rank in their place. The French
Government had now apparently come round to my way of thinking. The Ambassador
told me that in no circumstances would they dream of sending an Ambassador to
Angora, and that if the latter was chosen as the capital they thought that the whole
question ought to be reopened. I concurred in this view, and said that I should be
happy to discuss the question again when the moment arrived.
The second enquiry made by the Ambassador was with regard to the British
attitude in respect of the 3-mile territorial limit in American waters. He wanted to
know what we were going to do.
T told him that the matter would come under discussion in a few days' time at
the Imperial Conference, where the representatives of certain of the Dominions were
as much interested in the matter as ourselves. What view they would take I did not
know; but obviously, if the acceptance of Mr. Hughes’s proposal for an extension of
the 3-mile limit were seriously considered, it would apply to ships of foreign Powers
as well as our own, and I should be glad, therefore, to know what view the French
Government took on the subject.
The Ambassador himself appeared to be very sceptical about the desirability of
any such concession, but it did not transpire that his Government had formed any
definite view on the subject, and I gathered that they would concur with any line
that we might decide to take.
His Excellency having ceased to speak, and appearing unlikely to approach any
further topic, I asked him whether he had any observations to make to me about the
situation in the Ruhr. Upon his reply that he had no instructions to speak to me
on the subject, I said that I thought it was impossible for any length of time for the
Allies to continue to pursue a policy of inaction. The Germans had decided to
abandon the policy of passive resistance. So far as I knew, they were sincere in this
intention; at anv rate, I had no intimation to the contrary. It was true that
Germany was in a state of revolution, and no one could quite say what would happen
to-morrow or the day after; but this was a consequence which I had often fore
shadowed to his Excellency as the result of the Franco-Belgian policy, although he
had always declined to agree with it.
Even now, was his reply, the German nation was so inured to the maintenance
of order and the practice of discipline that he did not believe that any internal
convulsions would be more than ephemeral in character, and he expected order to be
presently restored.
I then reminded him of the various occasions on which not only he himself in
conversations with me, but M. Poincare also, had indicated that after the abandon
ment of passive resistance the conversations with regard to reparations must be
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