Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎170v] (340/348)

“and authorities and otherwise for the constitution and conduct of the business
‘ ‘ of the said Committee, as may be necessary to carry this Article into enect.
“ (ii.) In the event of any difference of opinion between the High Commn -
“ sioner and the said Committee upon any such matter as aforesaid, the Hig
“ Commissioner shall make a full report on the subject to the Secretary ot State,
“ whose decision thereon shall be final.''
With the breakdown of the Legislative Council, the proposed Committee has
never come into existence. It is proposed that the Arab Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. now in contemplation
should take its place for the purposes of the functions indicated m Article 84.
As regards the composition of the Arab Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , it is proposed that it should be
left to the High Commissioner to nominate suitable persons, it being ot course under
stood that representatives of all sections of the Arab community will be included.
Sir Herbert Samuel is of opinion that this proposal may be accepted, not indeed
oy the Arab extremists; who want representative Government and Arab ascendancy
al a bound, but by an appreciable section of Arab opinion, to whom indeed it would
not only be a great concession, but would mean the removal of one of the grievances
jn which they have laid most emphasis.
It goes without saying that the consent of the Zionists would also have to be
procured. We must do nothing that could be interpreted by them as a breach of faith,
and we do not want to staunch the flow of the subscriptions from the Jewish world,
which are still essential for the material prosperity, perhaps even for the continued
existence, of their colonies in Palestine, and secondarily for the future development
of Palestine as a whole. When, however, we recall the terms of their pledge as
recorded in the White Paper in the concluding paragraph of Dr. Weizmann’s letter
of the 18th June, 1922, and when they realise that the alternative may be the jeopardy,
if not the loss, of the National Home itself, it cannot, I think, be doubted that counsels
of wisdom will prevail.
W r e feel, however, very strongly that if this great concession to Arab sentiment
be made, it should only be made as part of an agreed settlement with them, that it
must be accepted by their representative organisations and by their leaders as a
final settlement, and that an end must be placed to the agitation, whether in
Palestine or outside, which has been the fruitful source of so much trouble, expense,
and even bloodshed. The arrangement is one that must be loyally implemented by
all parties—otherwise we shall have conceded much for no adequate return.
We further discussed the question whether it would be desirable to invest this
settlement, supposing it to be made, with the sanction of a wider authority than
our own, and to endeavour to secure for it the approval of the League of Nations.
We think that there is a great deal to be said for this course, and that, whether
through the medium of a Report to the Council of the League—in response to the
questionnaire which has already under the existing Regulations been addressed by
the League to the Mandatory Powder—or by more direct action, the sanction of the
League should be procured. It might even be desirable to apply formally for the
incorporation of the new Articles in the body of the Mandate itself. This, of course,
could only be done with the consent of all the Powers represented on the Council,
which it would be a little invidious for them to refuse. But such a plan must also
be conditional upon the absolute and unequivocal acceptance of the compromise by
the parties principally concerned, i.e., the Palestinian Jews and the Arabs themselves.
While this is the concrete suggestion that we submit to the Cabinet, we should
not like the latter to think that we have not considered whether it would be possible,
as in the case of Iraq, to place a limit of time to our commitments and our expendi
ture in Palestine. The circumstances, however, differ in toto. In Iraq we are dealing
with an Arab State and an Arab Government, which has already an organised
existence, and the entry of which into the League of Nations we contemplate in a
few years’ time. There is no parallel to this in Palestine, where the Arabs in present
circumstances can scarcely be regarded as capable either of forming a Government or
constituting a State. In Iraq we are under no commitments to a particular class of
the population as we are to the Zionists in Palestine. In Iraq we are not present,
as we are in the Holy Land, as the trustees, so to speak, of civilisation, into whose
hands has been committed by the world a sacred trust that it would be almost
shameful to abandon. There is, indeed, no analogy between the two situations.
Sir H. Samuel, in his recorded evidence, placed before us his estimate of the
future of Palestine, both as regards the military responsibilities and the financial
obligations which it will entail, and also as regards the economic development of th r '
country. These estimates may turn out to be unduly sanguine; already they have to