Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎153v] (306/348)

14. But there remains one charge in this part ot M. Poincare s note w hicli c annot
be so lightly dismissed. This is the insinuation that, at the risk or re ig ing a
disastrous war, Great Britain, while the Lausanne Conference was proceeding, has
kept up the aggressive spirit of the Greek Government and the Greek army on e
Maritza. It would be unusual in any case for such an insinuation, unsuppoi t
either by facts or by evidence, to find a place in an exchange of diploma ic no es
between Allies. Had M. Poincare consulted his own representatives at Lausanne as
to what actually passed there, he would have learned that by no party \\ere counse s o
moderation and warnings against the folly of a renewal of hostilities more consis
tently and, as it is believed, more successfully pressed upon the Greek Government
than by the British delegation. For any suggestion to the contrary there is no
justification. . . . .
15. M. Poincare terminates his memorandum with the final insinuation that it
is the custom of the Foreign Office to communicate confidential notes exchanged
between the two Governments to the press. That such an insinuation should emanate
from the Quai d'Orsay is indeed surprising. But small research is required
to show that there has hardly been a single inter-Allied conference at Paris
or elsewhere since the armistice of 1918 at which, contrary to agreement between the
heads of the Allied delegations, there has not been an incessant leakage of informa
tion from the French Foreign Office or the French delegation to the Irench press, and
also to British newspapers notorious for their systematic hostility to II is Majesty s
Government. Such leanage has, moreover, not only taken place at conferences. On
the ^4th August last an official reply from the Quai d'Orsay to the British Embassy
regarding certain proposals of His Majesty's Government for the holding of a
conference at Venice was outlined by the “ Temps " on the 24th August, although it
only reached Lord Hardiime on the 25th August. A similar divulgation took place
in the “ Temps ” on the 4th September of the contents of a note which had not then
reached Lord Hardinge about the Venice Conference. Again, it is clearly more than
a coincidence that the “ Temps ” of the 29th January in its leading article outlined
the whole line of arguments of M. Poincare's note of the 30th January to Lord Crewe
regarding the validity of the pact of the 4th September, 1914. Other examples
could without difficulty be found. In the circumstances, and in view of this continual
practice of French authorities, His Majesty's Government may be driven to
consider whether they will be able to maintain in the future the long-established
tradition of regarding such documents as confidential. In particular if, unhappily,
during the next few weeks the Turkish delegation should definitely and finally refuse
the generous terms of peace offered by the Allies, and should it become necessary to
explain this failure to the world, His Majesty’s Government may find it necessary
to publish the present exchange of notes in order that public opinion may be aware
of the grounds on which the French President of the Council has justified the part
played by him in the recent negotiations at Lausanne, and the reasons for which His
Majesty’s Government believe this intervention to have unfavourably affected the
chances of peace.
I am, &e.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
Annex 1
The following is the text of the Havas communique as it was published at
Lausanne on the night of the 30th January through the Agence telegraphique suisse,
and was replied to by the British delegation.
It appeared in the “Journal des Debats” of the 1st February, which stated that
it received it by telephone from its correspondent at Lausanne :—
“ Par I’entremise de son Haut-Commissaire a Constantinople, le Gouvernement
franc;.ais a adresse hier, a Angora, une communication importante dont le texte a
egaleinent ete transmis a Lausanne, a Londres et a Rome.
“ 11 ressort de cette communication que le projet de traite rends a la delegation
turque ne constitue pas, aux yeux de la France, une redaction definitive dont il
serait interdit de discuter les tenues, mais que ce projet marque simplement 1’etat
actuel des pourparlers et que rien ne s’oppose a des negociations ulterieures.
“ Le Gouvernement frangais a conscience d’avoir deja accorde, en ce qui
concerne les interets de la France, plus de concessions qu’il nen a obtenu.
Toutefois, il ne refuserait pas de iaire telles autres concessions qui lui paraitraient
raisonnables, si on lui donnait des motifs suffisants pour quil ait lieu d’y
eonsentir.