Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎152v] (304/348)

however, confirmation appeared to be given in Lausanne to this report by the
appearance practically of the text of the first five paragraphs of this communication
m the “ Bulletin du Jour ” of the “ Temps ” of the 30th January. The apprehen
sions aroused by the Havas communication at Lausanne were unfortunately
aggravated, when on the same day, the 30th January, the French plenipotentiary
came to me in order to urge me to abandon the plan upon which I understood that the
three Allied delegations had agreed a few days before in order to meet what
M. Bompard reported to be the intention of Ismet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , namely, to ask for eight
more da vs for discussion of the treaty.
6. The apprehensions thus excited were more than confirmed when the British
Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople telegraphed that, under instructions
from his Government, General Pell6 had informed Adnan Bey the day before that
the draft treaty to be presented to the Turks in no way constituted an ultimatum,
that the French Government were prepared to discuss modifications of it, and that
the French delegation had been instructed, in the interest of peace, to keep contact
with the Turkish delegation—apparently indefinitely. Mr. Henderson understood
from General Pelle that, while emphasising the extent of the concessions already
made, his instructions included an expression of France’s readiness to examine any
further plans made by Turkey in a benevolent spirit. As this information was
conveyed to Mr. Henderson twenty-four hours after the communication had been
made to Adnan Bey, the former felt it useless to protest against, or to comment
upon, it.
7. In vain I waited for some explanation from the French Government of
this unexpected step. It was true that on the 1st February an apparently inspired
communique from the Havas Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , the text of which I again quote in full in
the second annex to this despatch, appeared in the French press. This communique
purported to explain the previous Havas report, quoted in the first annex to this
despatch, by a reference to a telegram from M. Poincare to Mustapha Kemal of the
26th January. To this, since attention is again drawn to it by M. Poincare in his
present memorandum, I will return below. I need only here say that it contained
no mention whatever of the instructions, admittedly sent on the day before the
original Havas report, the 29th January, by M. Poincare to General Pell6.
8. It was, however,only upon the receipt of the above-mentioned official informa
tion from Mr. Henderson—as to the action of the French Government, although not as
to the reasons for it—that I felt it necessary to ask for the explanation which
M. Poincare has now been good enough to furnish. My request was not based
upon the alleged communication from M. Poincare to the Angora Government
referred to in the Havas communique of the 30th January, and by the “ Temps ” on
the 31st January, and I take note of his denial that the French Government did not
divulge the purport of this communication to the French press. I also take note of
his declaration that there are no semi-official papers in France. The actual relations
between the French press and the Quai d'Orsay are fully understood by His Majesty’s
Government.
9. Quite apart, however, from the question of any such leakage, the action of
the French Government in itself was serious enough. For to what did it amount?
At a moment when the Allied plenipotentiaries at Lausanne, at the close of a long
drawn and difficult negotiation with an enemy State, had agreed upon a procedure,
which, while giving the Turkish delegation every opportunity to state its case,
clearly showed that the period of discussion and concession was drawing to a close,
and that the time for decision had come, at a moment when a display of Allied unity
was imperative, the head of one of the Governments concerned, acting at a distance
from the scene, without consulting or even informing the other two Governments,
without apparently consulting even his own plenipotentiary, informed the enemy
Government in unmistakable terms that there was no Allied agreement as to
procedure, and that, as far at any rate as his Government was concerned, the limit
of discussion and concession had by no means been reached.
10. The effect of this action was as instantaneous as it was unfortunate. The
Turkish delegation immediately asked for eight days’ delay for further discussion.
My French colleague at Lausanne, presumably acting on M. Poincare’s instructions,
and notwithstanding the arrangement arrived at a few days before, insisted that this
delay must be granted. In consequence, in the conference building itself a public
display of Allied disunity was on the verge of being given to the Turks. Nevertheless, in
order to maintain the accord with my colleagues which their action had compromised,
I deferred, so far as I could, to their representations. The Turkish delegation,
however, encouraged by these symptoms of a rift in the Allied ranks, and by the