Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎151v] (302/348)

In reply to a question from the Ambassador whether 1 had a clear idea as to the
points on which an agreement between the French and ourselves was in my view
essential, and whether I could formulate them for M. Poincare’s consideration, I said
that I was a little tired of always being asked to put forward proposals for M. Poincare
to dissect or oppose, but that I had a pretty clear idea in my own mind of the points
upon which an Allied agreement was essential and which, therefore, I should be
prepared to discuss with M. Poincartb
A conversation ensued upon the position in Constantinople, which was, in my
opinion, of more perilous a description than the Count de Saint-Aulaire believed
it to be.
Upon his remarking that the French Government did not propose to send
reinforcements to the Turkish capital, I observed that I deprecated more than I could
say these constant asseverations on the part of M. Poincare that, whatever the
circumstances might be, nothing would induce him to fire a shot or to send a man.
They served only to aggravate the insolence of the Turks and to demonstrate the
futility of the Alliance. Circumstances might arise in Constantinople, even during
the ensuing week, in which, in a local riot or disturbance, or in the event of a serious
attack by the Kemalists upon the Allied forces, the blood of French soldiers might
be shed. Was it the French intention that, even in such a case, not a man should be
moved or a shot be fired ? I was unable myself to believe that it was. There
was one thing that I hoped Mr. Bonar Law and myself had made absolutely clear : we
were doing our best, in the face of considerable risk, to see the matter through together
with our Allies in Constantinople; but if, in the event of serious trouble arising, our
Allies were not going to stand by us, we should not hesitate to withdraw. We had
the ships, and we had the means, and to Gallipoli our troops would go. The discredit,
and even the shame, of the evacuation would be considerable, but it would not rest with
those who had been compelled to withdraw because they were called upon by their
Allies to bear the burden and to face the peril alone.
The Ambassador, who seemed to be imperfectly acquainted with the situation in
Constantinople, appeared to regard the alternative of evacuation as not to be dreamed
of, and he argued that the French declarations related only to a situation which might
be changed from dav to day.
After protesting many times that he did not think a clear agreement with France
on the most important points ought to be difficult to reach, he hinted, as he stood at
the door before leaving the room, that the situation would be much easier if French
public opinion had reason to believe that, in return for a solid front in Constantinople
and Lausanne, the French would have a chance of obtaining better terms as regards
reparations and the European situation. He knew perfectly well that the French
interest in the East was of equal importance with our own, and that the matter ought to
be settled on its own merits and apart from any other question; but French public
opinion did not take that view. It believed that a settlement was of much greater
moment to us than to France, and it was disposed, in return for a complaisant attitude
in the East, to demand some compensation in the West.
In reply to this suggestion, I earnestly deprecated the idea of making any bargain
about the matter. This was a line of diplomatic approach with which I had been
rendered only too familiar in my intercourse in recent times with Italian representatives.
But the Count de Saint-Aulaire was neither Signor de Martino nor Signor Schanzer.
and I hoped that he would not now adopt the tactics with which those statesmen had
made me only to frequently acquainted.
Hi's Excellency assured me that nothing was further from his thoughts than a
bargain of that description. Nevertheless, I am convinced that no auditor of our
conversation could possibly have doubted that such was his actual suggestion.
In parting, 1 impressed upon the Ambassador that the present moment was one, as
it seemed to me, of extreme importance in the relations of France and Great Britain.
The spokesmen of the two Governments had exchanged the warmest words of mutual
sympathy and respect in the past fortnight, and I was more than grateful for the kind
language in which M. Poincare had spoken of me in the French Chamber on the
preceding day. But if we now fell asunder over this Eastern question, the effect would
extend to a much wider area, and the situation would be wholly changed.
I am, &c.
CUBZON OF KEDLESTON.